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Preface
Microeconomists study the economic behavior of households and rms, from indi-
vidual decision problems to situations of strategic interaction. One might say that
they spend a little too much quality timewith the books of their good friends
Hal (Varian), Jean (Tirole) and Andreu (Mas-Colell). The upside though is that
after years of absorbing the theory and solving problem set after problem set, they
are able to tackle and analyze new developments in the constantly-evolving busi-
ness world and even make fairly educated guesses as to what optimal strategies
and policies could involve.
In this thesis, we use microeconomic tools to apply and newly develop models
of strategic interaction that aim to analyze and explain recent real-world phe-
nomena. This dissertation consists of three self-contained essays on topics in
industrial organization. Chapter 1 looks at the incentives of buyers and sellers
to bypass a platform when they engage in a repeated business relationship. In
chapter 2, we analyze buy-in tournaments, where the prize pool consists of the
participantsentry fees, as opposed to traditional tournaments, where the prizes
are usually provided by an external sponsor. In chapter 3, we analyze a multina-
tionals incentives to enter a foreign market via a joint venture with a local rm,
if it knows that the local rm might steal its technology and become a competitor
not only in the foreign market, but also in the multinationals home market.
In Chapter 1, we examine the problem of fee evasion in platform-intermediated
transactions, which have become increasingly important due to the rapid di¤usion
of the internet. In recent years, a large number of marketplaces have emerged
where people can easily trade goods and services. Among them are global ecom-
merce giants like the auction platform eBay, but also more local institutions like
dating clubs or platforms where one can hire babysitters. These marketplaces or
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platforms help buyers and sellers to nd each other and facilitate the transactions
between them. Without the platform, buyers and sellers would probably not even
know of the other ones existence, so that the platform provides a valuable service
in helping economic agents realize mutual gains of trade.
The platforms business model typically consists of charging a commission fee
for providing this service. This fee may decrease the buyers and the sellers gains
of trade, which is why they might look for ways to use the platforms service but
to avoid paying the commission fees. The incentives of buyers and sellers to avoid
the commission fee threaten the platforms business model and therefore its very
existence. This problem is particularly severe if buyers and sellers engage in a
repeated business relationship that involves multiple transactions (like tutoring
or babysitting), since buyers and sellers have great incentives to only use the
platform in order to nd each other, but to carry out all follow-up transactions
without involving the platform. Hence, the platform enables both parties to
carry out multiple transactions, but may only be able to charge a fee for the
initial transaction.
Although there exists a large literature on optimal platform pricing in two-
sided markets, no paper has yet studied the incentives of buyers and sellers to
bypass the platform in order to save on the commission fee. The lack of research
in this area is very surprising since this problem not only a¤ects new internet
marketplaces, but also more traditional intermediaries like real estate agents or
job agencies. We contribute to the literature by establishing a model of fee evasion
in repeated platform-intermediated transactions.
We consider a single platform that enables matches between a single seller
and multiple buyers and charges a commission fee for this service. We distinguish
between two groups of buyers: independent buyers, who are always willing to buy
the sellers product and reputation buyers, whose purchasing decisions depend on
the sellers reputation. The seller can propose to the independent buyers to make
transactions outside the platform in order to avoid the commission fee. While this
increases the sellers prot per transaction, it also sends a negative signal to the
prospective reputation buyers who interpret a high number of o¢ cial transactions
over the platform as a positive signal about the sellers quality. Hence, from
the sellers perspective, bypassing the platform and saving on the commission fee
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comes at the cost of fewer reputation buyers. The platform anticipates the sellers
behavior and sets its commission fee accordingly.
Surprisingly, we nd that in equilibrium the seller makes more o¢ cial trans-
actions if bypassing the platform is particularly protable. This counter-intuitive
result is due to the fact that private transactions hurt the platform in two ways:
rst, the platform does not earn a commission fee for the private transactions
between the seller and the existing independent buyers and second, the lack of
o¢ cial transactions acts to decrease the number of new reputation buyers, which
also decreases the platforms prots. Hence, it has a strong interest to set a low
commission fee in order to make o¢ cial transactions more attractive for the seller.
This commission fee has to be lower the more attractive private transactions are.
Interestingly, our model predicts that the platform will lower its fee to the point
where the seller nds it protable to declare a high share of follow-up transac-
tions in order to increase his reputation and attract more reputation buyers. We
further demonstrate that if the seller and the platform cooperate, the platform
sets its fee to zero and the seller only makes o¢ cial transactions, which maximizes
the number of transaction as well as social welfare.
In chapter 2, we analyze buy-in tournaments, a new form of competition that
has emerged in recent years. In a buy-in tournament, participants compete for a
prize pool that consists of the sum of their entry fees. This is very di¤erent from
traditional non-buy-in tournaments, where the prizes are usually provided by an
external sponsor rather than by the players themselves. Buy-in tournaments are
most prevalent in the world of the card game poker, where casinos and online
poker rooms organize thousands of tournaments every day with buy-ins starting
from as low as 10 cents up to $ 100,000 per participant. Other examples of buy-in
tournaments include online business contests as well as chess and backgammon
contests.
To date, the tournament literature has focused exclusively on non-buy-in tour-
naments, which have mainly been analyzed in the context of sports contests,
political elections or promotion procedures in internal labor markets. However,
there is no theoretical work on buy-in tournaments, which is surprising since
they exhibit very interesting economic features that are widely applicable and
that should make them a fascinating subject of study for economists in general
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and researchers in microeconomics and mechanism design in particular. We con-
tribute to the literature by building a theoretical model of buy-in tournaments
that studies the playersincentives to participate in tournaments with di¤erent
buy-in levels.
In our model, players of di¤erent skill levels compete for a prize pool that is
the sum of the playersentry fees. We rst look at how the participation of a
particular player a¤ects the utility of all other players in a game with a given
buy-in. A distinct feature of buy-in tournaments is that the e¤ect is ambiguous:
one the one hand, each player decreases the other playerschances of winning, on
the other hand, his buy-in increases the prize pool. Second, we study the players
game selection problem when there are several tournaments available that di¤er
in their buy-in level and di¢ culty. Finally, we investigate how a tournament
organizer can achieve self-selection of the players according to their skill level by
o¤ering a menu of tournaments.
Our main results can be summarized as follows: rst, the e¤ect of a particular
player on the other playersexpected utilities does not depend on his absolute skill
level, but on his skill level relative to the average of the eld. More precisely, the
e¤ect is positive if his skill level is below the average of the eld and negative, if his
skill level is above the average. This ambiguous e¤ect is in contrast to traditional
tournaments, where additional players always decrease the other playersutilities,
as they decrease everyone elses chances of winning, while the prize pool remains
the same.
Second, we nd that tournaments with higher buy-in levels and higher poten-
tial prots are also associated with more skillful competitors. Hence, players face
a trade-o¤ between their chances of winning and the expected prize money. We
show that under certain conditions, players with di¤erent skill levels also choose
di¤erent optimal buy-in levels, thereby truthfully revealing their skill level.
Finally, we show that a tournament organizer can achieve self-selection of the
di¤erent types by o¤ering a menu of tournaments and selecting a correct ratio
between the buy-ins.
In Chapter 3, we analyze the problem of technology theft in international
joint ventures. In recent years, world markets have increasingly been ooded
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by counterfeited products, which represents a major concern for the companies
that have invested great resources in creating innovative technologies and unique
intellectual property, only to see product pirates reap part of the benets. At the
origin of the technology theft is often a multinationals decision to form a joint
venture with a local rm in order to enter a developing market (e.g. China). Host
country governments often require such joint ventures with the intention that the
local rm will learn as much as possible about the multinationals technology and
management skills. Once the local rm has acquired the multinationals know-
how, it is in prime position to break up the joint venture and compete with the
multinational. So by agreeing to the joint venture, the multinational creates a
potential competitor, not only in the host country, but also in the multinationals
home markets.
Foreign market entry has been extensively studied in the international trade
literature. However, the papers focus almost exclusively on the foreign markets
characteristics in determining the multinationals entry incentives. Our approach
is di¤erent, as we are interested in the implications that the multinationals entry
decision has on its home market. We contribute to the literature by establishing a
model of foreign market entry, technology theft and competition, where we focus
on the competitive pressure in the multinationals home market as the main
determinant for the entry decision.
In our model, we consider a multinational that can enter a foreign market
through a joint venture with a local rm. The multinational is aware of the risk
that the local company may copy its technology and become a competitor not
only in the foreign market, but also in the home market. We rst study the joint
venture relationship between the two rms. In particular, we are interested in
whether the multinational wants to implement cooperation by the local company
by o¤ering a one-time payment. We then analyze the multinationals incentives
to enter the foreign market if it knows that this will create a new competitor.
We nd that if the local company enters the multinationals home market,
the negative impact on the multinationals prots is lower the higher the initial
level of domestic competitive pressure. We further show that the multinationals
incentives to protect its home market by implementing cooperation depend on
the level of domestic competition in a non-monotonic way: the incentives are
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highest when the multinational is a monopolist, lowest for low levels of domestic
competitive pressure and increasing but negative as competition increases.
We are particularly interested in the way that domestic competitive pressure
a¤ects the multinationals incentives to enter the foreign market. First, we con-
sider the case where the multinationals entry motive is market expansion. We
show that its entry incentives are strictly increasing in the number of domestic
rms. Second, we analyze the case in which the multinationals motivation for
entry is cost reduction. The relationship between the multinationals entry in-
centives and the number of domestic rms depends on the margins in the home
market and the degree of cost reduction. Our main ndings are that if margins
are low, the entry incentives are strictly increasing and concave in the number
of domestic rms. If margins are high, the entry incentives initially increase and
then decrease in the number of rms.
Our work also makes an interesting contribution to the literature on innovation
and market structure. In most of the literature, the costs of innovation include
expenses for patents, licences and/or research and development. These costs are
usually xed and independent of the market structure. In our model, entering
the foreign market creates a new competitor in the home market, which alters the
market structure and increases competitive pressure. Hence, the cost of pursuing
the cost-reducing innovation is not a monetary expense, but the emergence of a
new competitor. The cost of entry is the negative impact of the new competitor
and depends on the market structure at home.
Chapter 1
Fee Evasion and
Seller-Reputation in
Marketplaces
1.1 Introduction
In this Chapter, we analyze fee evasion in platform-intermediated transactions,
which have become increasingly important due to the rapid di¤usion of the in-
ternet. Intermediaries help sellers and buyers to nd each other and facilitate
the transactions between both parties. Auctions sites like eBay come to mind, as
well as marketplaces for babysitters, piano teachers and other freelance workers,
but also brick-and-mortar institutions like real estate agents (we will refer to all
these marketplaces and intermediaries as platforms). Without the platform, buy-
ers and sellers would probably not even know of the other ones existence, so the
platform provides a valuable service in helping economic agents realize mutual
gains of trade. The platforms business model consists of charging a commission
fee for providing this service. This fee may decrease the buyers and the sellers
gains of trade. Thus, they look for ways to use the service of the platform but to
avoid paying the commission fees. The incentives of buyers and sellers to avoid
the commission fee threaten the platforms business model and therefore its very
existence.
At eBay, the worlds largest online marketplace, the commission fee is between
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six and fteen percent of the nal sales price. The sellers who sell the most via
eBay, so-called powersellers, pay many hundreds of thousands of dollars per year
in commission fees alone. Naturally, the sellers try to nd ways to bypass eBay
in order to save on the commission fee, two of which are redirection and price-
shifting. Redirection is the common practice by a seller to post a link on its eBay
site that directs the prospective buyer to the sellers website outside of eBay
where no commission fees apply. So the seller uses eBays popularity to acquire
customers, but tries to deal with them outside of eBay. Another way for the
seller to save on the commission fee is by shifting prices: for the product itself,
he quotes a price that is much lower than the normal price, but charges very high
shipping costs, so that the nal price reects the real value of the product. The
seller does this because eBay only charges its fees on the sales price, but not on
shipping costs, so price-shifting allows the seller to reduce his fees. While these
practices are a problem for eBay, they do not threaten eBays business model,
since most buyers dislike to pay high shipping costs (even if the nal price is the
same) and prefer to buy at eBay rather than at the sellers own website, especially
if the buyer does not know the seller (buyers can punish sellers with negative
ratings at eBay, something they cannot do at the sellers own shop). In general,
fee evasion is not that big of a problem on platforms like eBay, where buyers and
sellers usually only interact once, and therefore depend more on the platforms
service.
Fee evasion is a much more severe problem if buyers and sellers engage in
a repeated relationship that involves multiple transactions. Buyers and sellers
have great incentives to only use the platform in order to nd each other and to
bypass the platform in all future follow-up transactions in order to save on the
commission fee which is then shared between the two parties. Hence, the platform
enables both parties to carry out multiple transactions, but may only be able to
charge a fee for the initial one. This conict of interest between buyers and
sellers on the one side and the platform on the other side arises in many markets.
Think of parents who make private arrangements for future transactions with
their childrens music teachers, tutors and babysitters after the parents have found
them through an agency or platform; landlords of summer residences who want
to let their houses to the same tenant every year without involving the agency
that matched landlord and tenant in the rst place; advertising companies who
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would like to book the same model for several campaigns without having to pay
the model agency every time. In this study, we are interested in such repeated
platform-intermediated relationships. Our analysis applies most to platforms for
freelance workers like getacoder.com (market for programmers), myhammer.de
(market for craftsmen) or care.com (marketplace for babysitters, petsitters etc.).
Obviously, the platform wants all follow-up transactions to be carried out over
the o¢ cial sales channel rather than privately. The challenge for the platform is
to incentivize the seller to o¢ cially declare his follow-up transactions with the
platform so that it can charge commission fees. One way for the platform to
achieve this is by making the transaction history of the seller public information
which allows the seller to build a positive reputation on the platform that will
help him attract new customers. This creates a trade-o¤ for the seller: on the one
hand, private transactions allow him to save on part of the commission fee, on
the other hand, o¢ cial transactions help him attract new customers. Examples
of such reputation-building schemes can be found at internet marketplaces like
eBay, Amazon or Yahoo!
Although there exists a large literature on optimal platform pricing in two-
sided markets, no paper has yet studied the incentives of buyers and sellers to
bypass the platform in order to save on the commission fee. The lack of research
in this area is very surprising since this problem not only a¤ects new internet
marketplaces, but also more traditional intermediaries like real estate agents or
job agencies. We contribute to the literature by establishing a model of fee evasion
in repeated platform-intermediated transactions. .
We consider a single platform that enables matches between a single seller
and multiple buyers and charges a commission fee for this service. We distinguish
between two groups of buyers: independent buyers, who are always willing to buy
the sellers product and reputation buyers, who base their purchasing decisions
on the sellers reputation. The seller can propose to the independent buyers to
make transactions outside of the platform in order to save on the commission
fee, which buyer and seller then split. While this increases the sellers prot per
transaction, it also sends a negative signal to the prospective reputation buyers,
who interpret a high number of o¢ cial transactions as a positive signal about
the sellers quality. This creates an interesting trade-o¤ for the seller: if he
Fee Evasion and Seller-Reputation in Marketplaces 10
declares a small number of repeat transactions, this increases his prots from
the transactions with the independent buyers, but decreases his reputation and
hence the number of reputation buyers. The sellers incentives to bypass the
platform depend on the platforms commission fee and the general attractivity of
the private transactions. The platform anticipates the sellers behavior and sets
its optimal commission fee accordingly. The platform faces the following tradeo¤:
while a high commission fee increases the prot per transaction, it also reduces
the number of o¢ cial repeat transactions, which in turn decreases the number
of reputation buyers. The higher the commission fee, the lower the number of
transactions that will be carried out over the platform.
Our results show that the platforms optimal fee and the sellers optimal share
of o¢ cial follow-up transactions depend on two main parameters: the rst pa-
rameter is the number of independent buyers who do not base their purchasing
decisions on the sellers reputation. The higher the number of independent buy-
ers, the less does the seller depend on attracting reputation buyers. The second
parameter is the sellers ability to capture a high share of the saved commis-
sion fee when making a private transaction with a buyer. The higher these two
parameters, the more attractive are private transactions for the seller.
Surprisingly, we nd that in equilibrium the seller makes more o¢ cial trans-
actions if bypassing the platform is particularly attractive. This counter-intuitive
result is due to the fact that private transactions hurt the platform in two ways:
rst, the platform does not earn a commission fee for the private transactions
between the seller and the existing independent buyers and second, the lack of
o¢ cial transactions acts to decrease the number of new reputation buyers, which
also decreases the platforms prots. Since the platform anticipates the sellers
behavior, it has great incentives to set a low commission fee in order to make
o¢ cial transactions more attractive for the seller. This commission fee has to be
lower the more attractive private transactions are. We show that the platform
lowers its fee to the point where the seller nds it protable to declare a high
share of follow-up transactions in order to increase his reputation and attract
more reputation buyers.
We also look at the case in which platform and seller behave cooperatively in
order to maximize the total number of transactions. We nd that this increases
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the joint prots of the platform because the platform will nd it optimal to set
its commission fee to zero and as a result, the seller will o¢ cially declare all of
his follow-up transactions, which attracts the most reputation buyers and max-
imizes the number of customers. The e¤ect on consumer surplus is ambiguous,
since there are some buyers who benet from the cooperation between platform
and seller and other buyers who prefer platform and seller to act independently
from each other. We show that social welfare is unambiguously higher in the
cooperative setting.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. After reviewing the
related literature in Section 1.2, we set up a two-period model in Section 1.3 that
illustrates the conict of interest between platform and seller when buyers and
sellers engage in a repeated relationship. In Section 1.4, we derive the platforms
optimal commission fee and the sellers optimal share of o¢ cial follow-up trans-
actions. In Section 1.5, we then study the e¤ect of relevant parameters on the
platforms and the sellers equilibrium choices. In Section 1.6, we consider the
case in which platform and seller behave cooperatively. Section 1.7 concludes.
All proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
1.2 Related Literature
In recent years, platforms have received great interest in the economic literature.
The literature on two-sided markets has focused on platform intermediaries, em-
phasizing the indirect network e¤ects which arise between the two sides of the
market when the latter have to a¢ liate with the platforms in order to be able to
transact with one another. Examples for such two-sided markets include market-
places like eBay where buyers and sellers meet; dating clubs, where women and
men hope to nd a match; video game systems, where consumers play the software
companiesgames; TV channels, where consumers watch advertising; and many
more. The most important contributions are by papers by Caillaud and Jullien
(2003), Rochet and Tirole (2003) and (2006) and Armstrong (2006). Virtually all
of these papers focus on the pricing structure chosen by two-sided platforms in
order to internalize (partially) network externalities. The main nding is that in
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order to overcome the "chicken and egg" problem, the platform should subsidize
the members of the side of the market, that attract the most members of the
other side of the market. This explains why women usually pay no membership
fees for dating clubs while men do and why watching TV is (mostly) free for
consumers, but airing advertising is costly for rms.
Another related strand of literature concerns the e¤ect of seller reputation
on prices. Theoretical models have typically generated a positive relationship
between seller reputation and the price (Klein and Le­ er (1981), Shapiro (1983),
Allen (1984), Houser and Wooders (2000)) in large part because the sellers rep-
utation is a proxy for quality characteristics that are unobserved prior to the
transaction. Important contributions have also been made by Tadelis (1999,
2002, 2003, 2008). There also exist recent empirical studies that analyze exten-
sive data collected from internet-based auction websites, including the websites
own index of the sellers reputation, to estimate the impact of reputation on the
price of the sellers product. Melnik and Alm (2002) and Houser and Wooders
(2006) both nd that bidders pay an economically and statistically signicant
premium to sellers with better reputation.
1.3 The Model
Consider a single seller S selling a product for a xed price p = 1: We assume
that the seller has zero costs. There are several buyers B who each have a
valuation of v for the sellers product. Each buyer only buys one unit and his
utility from a transaction is given by U = v   1. Transactions between both
parties may be intermediated by a platform P which charges a commission fee
0 <  < 1 for each transaction. We assume that the fee is being paid by the
seller1. The platform has zero cost. We further assume that buyer and sellers
only need the platforms services for their rst transaction but are able to carry
out all further transactions without the platform. We distinguish between two
groups of buyers: independent buyers and reputation buyers. We assume that
there are x independent buyers who are always willing to purchase the sellers
1This is the case at eBay, care.com and many other platforms.
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product. Reputation buyers however are somewhat more cautious and base their
purchasing decisions on the sellers reputation.
Consider a two period setting, with t = 1; 2: In t = 1; the seller uses the
platform in order to acquire x new independent buyers. The prot of the seller
is given by (1  )x and the platforms commission revenue is x: We assume
that all independent buyers are also willing to buy in t = 2: Now that the seller
and the independent buyers know each other, they could carry out their follow-
up transaction in t = 2 privately and without involving the platform, thereby
saving on the commission fee. If both parties agree to this, they split the saved
commission fee in a way that makes them both better o¤ compared to an o¢ cial
transaction over the platform. Let 0 <  < 1 be the share of the commission
fee that the seller can capture in private transactions. We also refer to this as
the sellers bargaining power. Hence, in a private transaction, the seller receives
a price p0 = 1    (1  ) > 1    and the buyers utility is given by U 0 =
v   (1   (1  )) > v   1: We assume that if the seller proposes a private
transaction, the buyer will always accept. We denote the number of o¢ cial follow-
up transactions in t = 2 by xO and the number of private follow-up transactions
by xP : Since we assume that all independent buyers also buy in t = 2; we have
xO + xP = x: We dene 0    xO
x
 1 as the share of follow-up transactions
that the seller o¢ cially declares.
We now turn to the reputation buyers, who enter the market in t = 2. The
platform makes the number of o¢ cial repeat purchases xO = x public infor-
mation. We assume that reputation buyers interpret a high number xO as a
positive signal about the sellers quality, since a customer is more likely to do a
repeat purchase with a high quality seller. We further assume that the number
of reputation buyers is increasing and concave in the number of o¢ cial follow-
up transactions. This is in line with the empirical observation that a seller has
diminishing marginal benets of reputation. On eBay, for example, the rst 50
positive user comments greatly increase the sellers reputation and have a positive
e¤ect on his prots, but another 1000 positive ratings are relatively less valuable.
With respect to the number of reputation buyers, we choose the simple function
xR = f(xO) =
p
x that captures the idea of diminishing returns of reputation.
The timing is as follows: at the start of t = 1, the platform chooses a com-
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mission fee . In t = 1, the platform helps the seller to acquire x independent
buyers. At the start of t = 2, the seller decides on the share of follow-up trans-
actions that he will carry out over the platform. This share also determines the
number of reputation buyers. The game is solved by backwards induction: the
platform anticipates the sellers incentives to make private transactions and sets
its optimal fee accordingly.
1.4 Equilibrium in the Platform-Seller Rela-
tionship
In this section, we study the equilibrium in the platform-seller relationship. First,
we derive the sellers reaction function, which species his optimal share of of-
cial follow-up transactions given any commission fee of the platform. We then
calculate the equilibrium values of the platforms commission fee and the sellers
optimal share of o¢ cial follow-up transactions.
1.4.1 The Sellers Decision Problem
Over the two periods, the seller may serve up to four di¤erent groups of buyers: in
t = 1; he serves the x independent buyers; in t = 2; he serves the xR reputation
buyers, the xO o¢ cial repeat buyers and the xP private repeat buyers. The
transactions with the rst three groups are all carried out over the platform,
while the transactions with the last group are uno¢ cial. Hence, the sellers total
prot is given by
S = (1  )
 
x+ xO + xR

+ (1  (1  ))xP : (1.1)
The existence of the reputation buyers creates an interesting trade-o¤: while
private transactions are more protable, they also limit the sellers ability to
attract reputation buyers. The sellers prot crucially depends on the platforms
commission fee . The sellers reaction function species his prot-maximizing
share of private follow-up transactions given any commission fee .
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Proposition 1.1 The sellers reaction function is given by
argmax

S = 
() =
1
x
(
1  
2
)2 (1.2)
with
d()
d
< 0;
d()
d
< 0 and
d()
dx
< 0: (1.3)
The optimal share  depends on the platforms commission fee ; the sellers
bargaining power  and the number of independent buyers x. The higher , the
less attractive o¢ cial transactions. The higher , the more protable private
transactions. Finally, the higher x; the less the seller depends on attracting
reputation buyers. All three e¤ects decrease the sellers incentives to o¢ cially
report follow-up transactions.
1.4.2 The Platforms Decision Problem
The platform earns the commission fee  on each o¢ cial transaction. Hence, its
prot function is given by
P = 
 
x+ xO + xR

= (x+ x+
p
x): (1.4)
Using the reaction function () = 1
x
(1 
2
)2 yields
P = (x+ (
1  
2
)2 + (
1  
2
)): (1.5)
The platform faces the following tradeo¤: while a high commission fee in-
creases the prot for every transaction, it also gives the seller more incentives to
make private transactions. This has two negative e¤ects: the number of o¢ cial
follow-up transactions declines, which also decreases the number of reputation
buyers. The platform takes these e¤ects into account and chooses the prot-
maximizing commission fee.
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Proposition 1.2 In equilibrium, the platforms prot-maximizing commission
fee is given by
 =
s
1
4x2   2 + 1 : (1.6)
The seller takes this equilibrium commission fee as given and chooses his
prot-maximizing share  according to his reaction function.
Proposition 1.3 In equilibrium, the sellers optimal share of o¢ cial follow-up
transactions is given by
 =
1
x
(
1 
q
1
4x2 2+1
2
q
1
4x2 2+1
)2: (1.7)
In equilibrium, the platforms and the sellers optimal actions are determined
by the sellers bargaining power  and the number of independent buyers x. In
the next section, we analyze how these parameters a¤ect  and :
1.5 Comparative Statics
The sellers bargaining power and the number of independent buyers x determine
the optimal choice of the seller (platform) directly and indirectly through the
e¤ect on the optimal choice of the platform (seller).
Interestingly, the direct e¤ect and the indirect e¤ect work in di¤erent direc-
tions and as a result, the overall e¤ects are ambiguous. We will show that if
private follow-up transactions are very attractive, the seller nds it optimal to
o¢ cially declare a high share of follow-up transactions. This counterintuitive
result arises because the more attractive private follow-up transactions are, the
more the platform has to lower its fees in order to make o¢ cial transactions more
attractive. This indirect e¤ect outweighs the direct e¤ect so that given the low
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commission fee, the seller nds it protable to o¢ cially declare a high share of
follow-up transactions in order to attract more reputation buyers.
1.5.1 The Determinants of the Equilibrium Commission
Fee
First, we analyze how the platforms optimal fee  depends on the sellers bar-
gaining power : The sellers bargaining power determines the share of the sellers
o¢ cial follow-up transactions  which in turn determines the platforms equilib-
rium fee.
Proposition 1.4 The platforms equilibrium commission fee is decreasing in the
sellers bargaining power, that is,
d
d
< 0: (1.8)
This result is intuitive. The sellers incentives to make a private transaction
are increasing in his ability to negotiate a favorable deal. In order to give the
seller an incentive to make o¢ cial transactions, the platform has to make this
option more attractive by lowering its commission fee. Hence, the higher the
sellers bargaining power, the lower the platforms optimal fee. The positive
e¤ect of a low commission fee for the platform is that a higher number of o¢ cial
repeat purchases also increases the number of reputation buyers, which benets
the platform.
Let us now look at the e¤ect of the number of independent buyers x on the
platforms optimal fee. The number of independent buyers determines the sellers
share of o¢ cial follow-up transactions which in turn determines the platforms
equilibrium fee.
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Proposition 1.5 The platforms equilibrium commission fee is decreasing in the
number of independent buyers, that is,
d
dx
< 0: (1.9)
If the number of independent buyers is high, the seller depends less on repu-
tation building which tends to decrease his share of o¢ cial transactions. Hence,
the higher the number of independent buyers, the lower will be the commission
fee set by the platform, in order to give the seller an incentive to use the o¢ cial
sales channel.
1.5.2 The Determinants of the Equilibrium Share of
Follow-Up Transactions
Next, we analyze how the sellers bargaining power  determines his optimal
share of o¢ cial follow-up transactions .
Proposition 1.6 The optimal share of o¢ cial follow-up transactions is increas-
ing in the sellers bargaining power, that is,
d
d
> 0: (1.10)
Interestingly we nd that the sellers bargaining power in private transactions
positively a¤ects the share of o¢ cial transactions. This result is not surprising,
since one would suspect that the opposite was the case. There are two e¤ects in
play. The direct e¤ect is that private transactions are more attractive if the seller
can capture a large part of the saved commission fee. This e¤ect tends to reduce
the share of o¢ cial transactions. However, there is also a countervailing indirect
e¤ect. The platform takes the sellers incentives into account when setting its
commission fee. Hence, if the sellers incentives to bypass the platform are high,
the platform must react by lowering its commission fee in order to make o¢ cial
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transactions more attractive. We nd that the indirect e¤ect outweighs the direct
e¤ect, so that in equilibrium, a seller with a high negotiation skill will be charged
such a low commission fee that he nds it more protable to o¢ cially declare
a high share of follow-up transactions and thereby attract a higher number of
reputation buyers.
Finally, we analyze how the optimal share of o¢ cial transactions  depends
on the number of independent buyers x who are interested in the sellers product
regardless of his reputation.
Proposition 1.7 The optimal share of o¢ cial follow-up transactions is increas-
ing in the number of independent buyers, that is,
d
dx
> 0: (1.11)
Again, we nd a surprising e¤ect. One would think that a high number of
independent buyers would result in a low share of o¢ cial transactions, since the
seller depends less on reputation buyers. But similarly to our previous result,
the platform has to react by lowering its fee to an extent that the seller nds it
protable to declare a higher share of transactions.
We nd that the seller nds it optimal to report more transactions the higher
his bargaining power and the higher the number of independent buyers, even
though their direct e¤ect should be negative. This is due to the fact that these
two parameters have have an even stronger e¤ect on the platform. The two
parameters act to decrease both the number of o¢ cial transactions and, as a
result, the number of reputation buyers. Hence, the platform is forced to lower
its fee by a signicant amount, which makes o¢ cial transactions more attractive
for the seller. The more attractive private transactions, the more will the platform
reduce its fees, which results in a high share of o¢ cial transactions.
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1.6 Cooperation between Platform and Seller
So far, we have analyzed the situation in which the platform and the seller are
separate agents, each with their own prot-maximizing objectives. We call this
the non-cooperative case. Next, we consider the case when the platform and the
seller cooperate and act to maximize joint prots. We call this the cooperative
case. The goal of this section is to compare producersand consumerssurplus
as well as total welfare in both cases.
1.6.1 Platform and Seller Perspective
If the seller and the platform cooperate, the objective of the rms is to maximize
joint prots by maximizing the number of transactions on the platform.
Proposition 1.8 If the platform and the seller behave cooperatively, the platform
charges no commission fee, that is,  = 0 and the seller o¢ cially declares all his
follow-up transactions, that is,  = 1. Hence joint prots are given by
C = 2x+
p
x (1.12)
and are higher than the sum of prots in the non-cooperative case,
P + S = x+ x+
p
x+ (1  + )(1  )x: (1.13)
In the non-cooperative case, the platform charges a positive commission fee
which induces the seller to carry out a certain share of his follow-up transactions
privately. This, however, makes the seller less attractive for reputation buyers
and there are fewer transactions in t = 2 from which both platform and seller
could benet. It is clearly optimal for both parties to act in a way that attracts
as many buyers as possible. The joint prot can be split among the rms so that
both are better o¤ than in the non-cooperative case.
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1.6.2 Buyer perspective
We now examine how the cooperation between platform and seller a¤ects the
buyersutility. Interestingly, from the buyersperspective, it is not clear whether
the cooperative or the non-cooperative case is more benecial because there are
several groups of buyers with di¤erent objectives. We have to distinguish between
the x independent buyers in t = 1; and the xO o¢ cial repeat buyers, the xP private
repeat buyers and the xR reputation buyers in t = 2:We will look at each of these
groups in turn.
For the x independent buyers and the xO o¢ cial repeat buyers in t = 2; it
makes no di¤erence whether platform and seller cooperate or not, as they have
to pay the full price p = 1 in both cases.
The analysis is more interesting for the private repeat buyers xP : The repeat
buyers favor the non-cooperative case, since the seller then has an incentive to
bypass the platform by proposing a favorable deal with a lower price to the buyer.
Finally, there are the reputation buyers xR: Reputation buyers favor the co-
operative setting, in which both platform and seller work together to maximize
the number of o¢ cial follow-up transactions in order to signal a high degree of
quality and trustworthiness, which gives rise to a higher number of reputation
buyers, who are able to enjoy a customer surplus v   1.
In the cooperative case, the platforms commission fee is equal to zero and
the seller o¢ cially declares all his follow-up transactions, which maximizes the
number of reputation buyers xR = x: In the cooperative case, total consumer
surplus is given by
CSC = (v   1)
 
2x+
p
x

: (1.14)
In the non-cooperative case, the platform charges a positive commission fee, which
gives the seller an incentive to make private follow-up transactions. This benets
the xP private repeat buyers who will be able to buy at a lower price. However,
the smaller share of o¢ cial follow-up transactions results in a smaller number of
reputation buyers. In the non-cooperative case, total consumer surplus is given
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by
CSNC = (v   1) (x+ x+px) + (1   (1  )) (1  )x: (1.15)
Proposition 1.9 The consumerssurplus in the cooperative case is given by
CSC = (v   1)
 
2x+
p
x

: (1.16)
and the consumerssurplus in the non-cooperative case is given by
CSNC = (v   1) (x+ x+px) + (1  + ) (1  )x: (1.17)
We have CSC > CSNC for a high commission fee ; for a high number of in-
dependent buyers x, for a low valuation of the product v and for a low seller
bargaining power .
The result is ambiguous because of the conicting interests of reputation buy-
ers and those repeat buyers who want to benet from the cheaper private follow-
up transactions.
First, if the commission fee  is small, the increase in consumer surplus from
having more reputation buyers would outweigh the benets from the cheaper
private follow-up transactions. In this case, a cooperative setting would be more
favorable for consumers.
Second, if the number of independent buyers x is small, the increase in con-
sumer surplus from having more reputation buyers would outweigh the benets
from the cheaper private follow-up transactions. Also, the number of private
follow-up transactions is smaller the smaller x. In this case, a cooperative setting
would be more favorable for consumers.
Third, if the buyersvaluation v for the product is high, the increase in con-
sumer surplus from having more reputation buyers would outweigh the benets
from the cheaper private follow-up transactions. In this case, a cooperative set-
ting would be more favorable for consumers.
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Finally, if the seller is able to capture a large share  of the commission in pri-
vate follow-up transactions, the latter become less attractive to t = 1 consumers
and the increase in consumer surplus from having more reputation buyers would
outweigh the benets from the cheaper private follow-up transactions. In this
case, a cooperative setting would be more favorable for consumers.
1.6.3 Social welfare
Total welfare is given by the sum of the rmsprots and the consumer surplus.
As seen above, the rmsprots are always higher in the cooperative case than in
the non-cooperative case. However, whether consumerssurplus is higher in the
cooperative case is ambiguous. What does this mean overall for social welfare?
Proposition 1.10 In the cooperative case, social welfare is given by
SWFC = v(2x+
p
x) (1.18)
and is unambiguously higher than in the non-cooperative case.
We have seen that the platform and the seller prefer the cooperative case.
Even though it is ambiguous whether consumer surplus is higher in the cooper-
ative case, it is clear that social welfare is higher in the cooperative case. The
reason why some buyers might prefer the non-cooperative case is because they
can save on some part of the commission fee. From a social point of view how-
ever, the consumerssavings in commission fees come at the expense of the selling
side, so these two e¤ects even out. From a social point of view, it is always more
desirable to maximize the number of transactions, which is why the cooperative
case results in higher social welfare.
1.7 Conclusion
We have set up a two period model that analyzes the relationship between a
platform and a seller where the latter engages in a repeated business relationship
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with a group of buyers. In particular, we have looked at how the attractiveness
of bypassing the platform a¤ects the sellers choice of the share of transactions
he o¢ cially declares and how this determines the platforms optimal commission
fee.
We nd that the higher the sellers incentives to bypass the platform, the
more transactions he will o¢ cially declare. This e¤ect arises because the platform
knows about the sellers incentives to bypass the o¢ cial channel and lowers his
commission fee to the point where it becomes protable for the seller to make
fewer private transactions and to benet from the reputation benets associated
with having many o¢ cial customers.
We also look at the case in which platform and seller behave cooperatively in
order to maximize the total number of transactions. We nd that this increases
the joint prots of the platform and the seller and even though the e¤ect on
consumer surplus is ambiguous, it can be shown that the social welfare is higher
in such a cooperative setting compared to the case in which the seller and the
platform do not maximize joint prots.
In this study, we have assumed that the number of reputation buyers is in-
creasing and concave in the number of o¢ cial transactions. While the concavity
of the function is certainly reasonable and in line with empirical observations, in
a next step, we would like build a micro-foundation in order to endogenize the
number of reputation buyers. One approach could be to assume that these buyers
are risk averse and uncertain about the sellers quality. They could interpret the
share of o¢ cial follow-up transactions as the probability that the sellers prod-
ucts are of high quality or that the seller is honest. Hence, making a transaction
with the unknown seller is a lottery for the buyer. One could derive the buyers
willingness to pay from his expected utility when making a transaction. We think
that this could be a promising approach in order better explain the purchasing
decisions of the reputation.
It would further be interesting to test our results empirically. Our model pre-
dicts that in markets where the seller can easily bypass the platform, commission
fees should be lower, which gives the seller an incentive to make more o¢ cial
follow-up transactions. In a next step, one could collect data on commission fees
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of di¤erent marketplaces for goods and services use our model in order to try to
explain di¤erences in commission fees.
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1.8 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1.1:
The sellers prot function is given by
S = (1  )
 
x+ xO + xR

+ (1  (1  ))xP (1.19)
= (1  ) (x+ x+px) + (1  (1  ))(1  )x: (1.20)
The rst order condition with respect to  is given by
dS
d
=   1
2
p
x (+ 2
p
x   1) != 0: (1.21)
We obtain the sellers reaction function by solving the rst-order condition for :
() =
1
x
(
(1  )
2
)2: (1.22)
Di¤erentiating () with respect to  gives
d()
d
=
  1
2x32
< 0: (1.23)
Di¤erentiating () with respect to x gives
d()
dx
=  (  1)
2
4x222
< 0: (1.24)
Di¤erentiating () with respect to  gives
d()
d
=  (  1)
2
2x23
< 0: (1.25)
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Proof of Proposition 1.2
The platforms prot function is given by
P = (x+ x
O + xR) = 

x+ ()x+
p
()x

: (1.26)
Inserting the sellers reaction function () = 1
x
(1 
2
)2 yields
P = (x+ (
1  
2
)2 + (
1  
2
)): (1.27)
The rst order condition of P with respect to  is given by
dP
d
=
 
4x22   22 + 2   1
422
!
= 0: (1.28)
Solving for  yields
 =
s
1
4x2   2 + 1 : (1.29)
Note that  < 1 is equivalent to x > 1
2
: We will henceforth refer to this as
condition (1).
Proof of Proposition 1.3:
By inserting  =
q
1
4x2 2+1 : into the sellers reaction function 
 () ; we obtain
the equilibrium share of o¢ cial follow-up transactions:
 =
1
x
 (
(1 
q
1
4x2 2+1 :)
2
q
1
4x2 2+1 :
)2: (1.30)
Proof of Proposition 1.4:
Di¤erentiating the platforms optimal fee  with respect to the sellers bargaining
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power  gives
d
d
=
1  4x 
4x2   2 + 12q 1
4x2 2+1
: (1.31)
Note that d

d
< 0 is equivalent to x > 1
4
: From condition (1), we know that
x > 1
2
must hold. It follows that x > 1
4
must also hold and hence, d

d
< 0:
Proof of Proposition 1.5:
Di¤erentiating the platforms optimal fee  with respect to x yields
d
dx
=   2
2 
4x2   2 + 12q 1
4x2 2+1
< 0: (1.32)
Proof of Proposition 1.6:
Di¤erentiating the sellers optimal share
 =
1
x
 (
(1 
q
1
4x2 2+1)
2
q
1
4x2 2+1
)2 (1.33)
with respect to  gives
d
d
=
1
2x3
 
(2  3 + 4x2)
s
1
4x2   2 + 1   (2  )
!
: (1.34)
First, note that 2  3 + 4x2 > 0 is true for x > (3 2)
42
: Remember that due to
condition (1), it must hold that x > 1
2
. Note that 1
2
> (3 2)
42
is equivalent to
 < 2 which is true since  < 1. Hence, x > (3 2)
42
also holds and 2 3+4x2 >
0:
Second, note that (2   3 + 4x2)
q
1
4x2 2+1   (2   ) > 0 is equivalent to
23 (4x  1) (2x   1) > 0: Due to condition (1), 2x   1 > 0 holds. Note
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further that 4x   1 > 0 for x > 1
4
. Also, 1
2
> 1
4
is equivalent to  < 2 which
clearly holds. Hence, we have shown that d

d
> 0:
Proof of Proposition 1.7:
Di¤erentiating the sellers optimal share
 =
1
x
 (
1 
q
1
4x2 2+1
2
q
1
4x2 2+1
)2 (1.35)
with respect to x gives
d
dx
=
1
2x22
 
(2x2 + 1  2)
s
1
4x2   2 + 1   (1  )
!
: (1.36)
First, note that 2x2 + 1  2 > 0 is true for x > (2 1)
22
: Remember that due to
condition (1), it must hold that x > 1
2
. Note that 1
2
> (2 1)
22
is equivalent to
 < 1 which clearly holds. Hence x > (2 1)
22
also holds and 2x2 + 1  2 > 0:
Second, note that (2   3 + 4x2)
q
1
4x2 2+1   (2   ) > 0 is equivalent to
2 (2x   1) (1 + 2x   2) > 0: Due to condition (1), 2x   1 > 0 must hold.
Note further that 1 + 2x   2 > 0 for x > (2 1)
2
. Furthermore, 1
2
> (2 1)
2
is
equivalent to  < 1 which clearly holds. Hence, we have shown that d

dx
> 0:
Proof of Proposition 1.8:
The platforms prots are given by
P = (x+ x+
p
x): (1.37)
The sellers prots are given by
S = (1  )(x+ x+px) + (1  (1  ))(1  )x: (1.38)
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The sum of prots is given by
P + S = x+ x+
p
x+ (1  (1  ))(1  )x: (1.39)
The derivative of the sum of prots with respect to  is given by
d (P + S)
d
=  x (1  ) (1  ) < 0: (1.40)
Since the joint prots decrease in , the platform will set  = 0.
The derivative of the sum of prots with respect to  is given by
d (P + S)
d
=
1
2
(
p
x + 2x (1  )) > 0: (1.41)
Since the joint prots increase in , the seller will set  = 1
With  = 0 and  = 1, total joint prot in the cooperative case is given by
C = 2x+
p
x: (1.42)
We now show that joint prots in the cooperative case C are larger than the
sum of prots in the non-cooperative case P + S: Note that C > P + S is
equivalent to
(1 p)px+ (1  )(1  )x > 0 (1.43)
which clearly holds.
Proof of Proposition 1.9:
In the non-cooperative case the consumer surplus of the independent buyers is
given by
(v   1) (x+ x) + (v   (1  + ))(1  )x (1.44)
and the consumer surplus of the reputation buyers is given by
(v   1)px: (1.45)
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Hence total consumer surplus in the non-cooperative case is given by
CSNC = (v   1)(2x+px) + (1  )(1  )x: (1.46)
In the cooperative case, the consumer surplus of the independent buyers is given
by
2(v   1)x (1.47)
and the consumer surplus of the reputation buyers is given by
(v   1)px: (1.48)
Hence, total consumer surplus in the cooperative case is given by
CSC = (v   1)
 
2x+
p
x

(1.49)
Note that
CSC > CSNC for
(v   1)
(1  )px
1 p
1   > 1: (1.50)
The left hand side of the inequality increases in v, ,  and decreases in  and x:
Proof of Proposition 1.10:
Welfare in the cooperative case is given by
WFC = CSC + C = v(2x+
p
x): (1.51)
Welfare in the non-cooperative case is given by
WFNC = CSNC + P + S = vx+ (v   1)x+ vpx+ x: (1.52)
Note that WFC > WFNC since  < 1:
Chapter 2
A Model of Buy-In Tournaments
2.1 Introduction
In recent years, a new form of tournaments has emerged, where players need to
pay a buy-in in order to participate and where the prize pool is the sum of
these buy-ins. This is very di¤erent from traditional tournaments, where there
is no buy-in and the prize pool is normally provided by external sources rather
than by the players themselves.
Buy-in tournaments are most prevalent in the world of the card game poker,
where casinos and online poker rooms organize thousands of tournaments every
day with buy-ins starting from as low as 10 cents up to $ 100,000 per partic-
ipant. At the 2006 World Series of Poker Main Event in Las Vegas (pokers
most prestigious tournament), almost 9000 players each paid $ 10,000 to enter
the tournament. The total prize pool was more than $ 80,000,000 of which the
eventual winner took home $12 million. Another example of buy-in tournaments
are fantasy sports, a very popular pastime in the U.S. Websites like Yahoo! allow
sports fans to manage ctional sports teams that compete against each other in
di¤erent fantasy leagues. Each participant must pay a fee in order to enter the
competition and at the end of the season, the organizing body distributes the
sum of the participantsentry fees among the top-ranked players. Even in very
traditional games such as chess or backgammon, competitions are increasingly
organized as buy-in tournaments.
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In traditional non-buy-in tournaments, participants compete for a xed prize
that is not a direct function of the number of participants. The best known
examples of such tournaments are sports contests such as soccer, tennis or golf
championships, but also tender procedures, beauty contests, political elections
and promotion procedures in the labor market. In all these tournaments, the
prizes to be won are provided by some external source and not by the participants
themselves. In the case of sports contests, the money comes from sponsors, TV
stations and ticket sales. In the job market example, the prize is provided by
the employer. In traditional tournaments, even if there is no buy-in, participants
may still have to incur some cost if they want to participate such as acquiring
the necessary skills, qualifying for the tournament or the cost of application.
However, these costs have no e¤ect on the prize pool. As a consequence, additional
participants tend to have negative external e¤ects on all other participants, as
the newcomers only decrease everyone elses chances of winning the tournament
while the prize remains constant. Hence, in traditional tournaments with a xed
prize, tournament participants would like to have as few other competitors as
possible.
The situation is di¤erent in buy-in tournaments, where each participants
entry fee is directed towards the prize pool, which benets all other players. This
raises some interesting questions: what is the overall impact of an additional
participant on all other participants if the additional player increases the prize
pool but also decreases everyone elses chances of winning? How does the skill
level of the additional player inuence the utility of all other players? Under
which circumstances does a player nd it protable to participate in a given
tournament? What determines the playersoptimal game selection when they
can choose between several tournaments with di¤erent buy-in levels? Do players
have an incentive to reveal their type by self-selecting into the corresponding
games? How can the tournament organizer achieve self-selection?
To analyze these questions, we establish the rst theoretical model of buy-in
tournaments, where the prize pool is a direct function of the number of players,
and each players probability of winning the tournament is a function of the
number of players at the di¤erent skill levels. To our knowledge, no such model
already exists. We rst look at the participation externalities that all players exert
on each other. We then look at the playersgame selection problem, when they
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can choose to participate in one of several tournaments that di¤er in their buy-in
levels and the strength of the competition Finally, we analyze how a tournament
organizer can use di¤erent buy-in levels to sort the players into di¤erent ability
groups.
Our main results can be summarized as follows: rst, we nd that in a buy-
in tournament, the participation externalities of one player on all other players
are ambiguous. On the one hand, more players make it more di¢ cult for any
individual to win the tournament. On the other hand, their additional entry fees
increase the prize pool. Interestingly, the overall e¤ect and whether a particular
player increases or decreases the other playersexpected utility of participating in
the tournament does not depend on his absolute skill level, but on his skill level
relative to the average of the eld. More precisely, we show that an additional
player increases everyone elses expected utility if his skill level is below the av-
erage of the eld and decreases everyone elses expected utility if his skill level is
above the average of the eld.
Second, when we look at the playersgame selection problem, we nd that
tournaments with higher buy-in levels and higher potential prots are also associ-
ated with more skillful competitors. Hence, when players have to choose between
di¤erent buy-in levels, they face a trade-o¤ between their chances of winning the
tournament and the expected prize money. We show that if the expected average
skill level and the non-monetary utility from participating in the tournament do
not increase too rapidly in the buy-in levels, players with di¤erent skill levels also
have di¤erent optimal buy-in levels, thereby truthfully revealing their skill level.
Finally, we show that a tournament organizer can achieve self-selection by the
di¤erent types by organizing multiple tournaments and selecting a correct ratio
between the buy-ins.
We want to emphasize that this chapter is not about poker but about the
theory of buy-in tournaments. Poker is just the eld where this form of tour-
nament is very prevalent, but in principle, all the traditional tournaments could
also be organized as buy-in tournaments. Therefore, it is important to analyze
their distinct features and the underlying principles. As a next step, it would be
interesting to compare both kinds of tournaments with respect to criteria such
as e¢ ciency or incentive provision and determine which tournament form is most
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appropriate for which real world application. This, however, is beyond the scope
of this chapter.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the
related literature. In Section 2 we set up a model of buy-in tournaments. In
Section 3, we analyze how participation of players of di¤erent skill a¤ects the
expected of all other players. In Section 4, we analyze the playersgame selection
problem. In Section 5, we look at the tournament organizers ability to achieve
self-selection. Section 6 concludes. All proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2.2 Related Literature
To date, the tournament literature has exclusively focused on non buy-in tourna-
ments. Rank-order tournaments are often presented as incentive devices which
are useful in practice since rewards are tied only to ordinal comparisons. Origi-
nating in sports, these tournaments have been widely applied to align incentives
in a principal-agent setting. The main application which the theory has found re-
lates to an internal labor market. This literature focuses mainly on the provision
of e¤ort incentives. In their seminal work, Lazear and Rosen (1981) show that
rank-order tournaments can, under certain conditions, function as optimal labor
contracts yielding the rst-best level of e¤ort in an environment characterized by
moral hazard. Other important contributions include Green and Stokey (1983),
Nalebu¤ and Stiglitz (1983) and Rosen (1986).
Furthermore, the literature also focuses on the selection properties of tourna-
ments if the ability of the participants is private information and the tournament
sponsor wants to identify their true ability. Bhattacharya and Guasch (1988) use
a reward-penalty structure to demonstrate how rank-order tournaments can be
used to achieve that works self-select into ability groups. Clark and Riis (2001)
use a bonus structure in order to achieve self-selection of the participants.
More recently, there has been an increased interest in optimal tournament
structures and optimal prize allocations (Moldovanu and Sela, 2001 and 2006).
There has been some empirical literature related to buy-in tournaments, but
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none of the papers models the theoretical features that are distinct to buy-in
tournaments. Goldreich and Pomorski (2007) study bargaining at the end of
high-stakes online poker tournaments where the prize pool is a direct function of
the participantsentry fees and in which participants often negotiate a division
of the prize money rather than risk playing until the end. The participants
have an incentive to negotiate such deals since even in tournaments with over
7,000 players, the disparity in prize money between rst and say tenth place
is generally very large. Goldreich and Pomorski analyze data from 1246 online
poker tournaments with an average prize pool of more than $ 80,000 and the
largest tournaments have prize pools in excess of $1 million. They nd that
the likelihood of a successful deal increases in the stakes but that overall, risk-
reducing deals are not completed as often as one would expect given the top-heavy
prize distribution2. Lee (2004) studies risk-taking behavior of professional poker
players. He analyzes data from tournaments of the World Poker Tour over the
span of two years. He nds that the degree of risk-taking when facing a particular
decision in a tournament depends on the players relative position at that time
and the structure of the prize pool, which is usually very convex. Moreover, he
shows that the playersincentives for risk taking are signicantly more responsive
to expected losses than gains.
To our knowledge, there is no theoretical work on buy-in tournaments, which
is surprising since they exhibit very interesting economic features that are widely
applicable and that should make them a fascinating subject of study for econo-
mists in general and researchers in microeconomics and mechanism design in par-
ticular. We contribute to the literature by building a theoretical model of buy-in
tournaments that studies the players incentives to participate in tournaments
with di¤erent buy-in levels.
2At a recent online tournament, over 7,300 players created a prize pool of over $ 3.6million.
The winner received more than $ 450,000 while the tenth-place nisher received less than $
20,000
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2.3 The Model
Consider a one-shot winner-takes-all3 tournament. To participate, players must
pay a buy-in B; which is set aside entirely for the prize pool. Participation is
not restricted. The players are risk-neutral and di¤er in their skill level si, with
i = 1; ::; N and s1 = 1 < s2 < ::: < sN . The number of players with skill level si
that enter the tournament is ni. The total number of participants is nT =
NX
i=1
ni
and the prize pool, that is, the rst prize is given by P = nTB.
The winning probability of a player of particular skill level sj is given by
pj = f(sj; si6=j; ni; ni6=j) and is a function of his own skill level sj, the other
playersskill levels si6=j and the number of players ni at each skill level si. Skill
levels are common knowledge among the players4. We assume that the probability
of winning the tournament is a linear function of the skill level. If there are two
players of skill level sk and sl with sk < sl; then the player of skill level sl is
sl=sk times as likely to win as the player of skill level sk. Let p1 = pmin be the
winning probability of the player with the lowest skill level s1. Then all winning
probabilities can be expressed as multiples of the minimum winning probability
pmin and are given by pi = sipmin: Clearly, we have
NX
i=1
nipi = 1, that is, the sum
of the winning probabilities of all players must be equal to one.
In addition to the prospect of winning the rst prize, players may also enter
the tournament because they derive some non-monetary utility5 v(B) from partic-
ipating that is independent from the outcome of the tournament. This additional
utility may include non-monetary benets like the joy and thrill of competition or
the learning experience that players gain from participating. These non-monetary
3Most of the literature has focused on winner-takes-all contests. See Moldovanu and Vela
(2006).
4This assumption is widely used in the literature.
5A couple of years ago, billionaire Andy Beal famously challenged the best professional
poker players in the world to play for millions of dollars. He became a very capable player
and was even winning initially, before losing several million dollars. Billionaire Guy Laliberté,
founder of successful Cirque du Soleil, has been a big loser in high-stakes poker games since
2006. Even economist Steven Levitt admits to play poker in situations where he will be a loser
in expectation. Goldreich and Pomorski (2008) also talk about the existence of non-monetary
utility.
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benets may even be the main factor why some players decide to play in the tour-
nament. We assume that the non-monetary utility is increasing in the buy-in level
B, v0(B) > 0. The higher the stakes, the higher the non-monetary utility6.
Consider two di¤erent types of players, professional players and amateur play-
ers. What distinguishes the two types is not their skill level: amateur players may
be of lower, equal or even higher skill than professional players. The two types
di¤er in their utility of participating in the tournament. More specically, we
assume that professional players are only interested in the potential monetary
benets of entering the tournament and have v(B) = 0. Amateur players also
care about the potential winnings and, in addition, derive some non-monetary
benets v(B) > 0 from playing.
We assume that all players have rational expectations about the other players
skill levels and are able to correctly anticipate in which tournament a player
of a given skill level wants to participate. These expectations lead to players
participation decisions that in equilibrium are consistent with the expectations.
Hence, players have correct expectations about the expected average skill level
at each buy-in level and decide to participate in the tournament that maximizes
their expected utility.
2.4 Expected Utility and Participation Exter-
nalities
In this section, we will derive the playersexpected utility from playing in the
tournament and how their entry decisions a¤ect all other players. A player of
skill level sj has a probability pj = f(sj; si6=j; ni) of winning the tournament.
This probability is a function of his own skill level, and the number and skill
levels of his competitors.
6Goldreich and Pomorski (2008) also make this observation.
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Proposition 2.1 A player of skill level sj has a probability
pj = sj=
NX
i=1
nisi (2.1)
of winning the tournament, with
dpj
dsj
> 0;
dpj
dsi
< 0 for i 6= j and dpj
dni
< 0 for i = 1; :::; N: (2.2)
The probability of winning increases in the own skill level and decreases in
the skill level of all other players and in the number of players at each skill level.
Next, we are interested in the expected utility from participating in a tourna-
ment. We dene
s =
NX
i=1
sini=
NX
i=1
ni (2.3)
as the average skill level of the eld.
Proposition 2.2 The expected utility of participating in a tournament for a
player of skill level si is given by
EUi = (
si
s
  1)B + v(B) (2.4)
with
dEUi
dsi
> 0;
dEUi
ds
< 0: (2.5)
The expected utility increases in the own skill level and decreases in the aver-
age skill level of the eld. We nd that the expected prot crucially depends on
the relationship of the own skill level si relative to the average skill level of the
eld.
We now look at the impact of an additional player on all other players. Each
additional player has a positive externality on the other players because his buy-
in increases the prize pool. The negative e¤ect of course is that each player also
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reduces the chances of all other players to win the tournament. Because of these
opposing externalities, the overall e¤ect of one player on the expected utility
of all other players is not obvious. We will look at this overall e¤ect next by
di¤erentiating the expected prot EUi with respect to the number nj of players
of skill sj.
Proposition 2.3 The overall external e¤ect of one tournament participant on
the expected utility of the other participants does not depend on his absolute skill
level, but rather on his skill level relative to the average skill level of the eld. The
overall external e¤ect is given by
dEUi
dnj
= si(s  sj)=(
NX
i=1
nisi)
2B (2.6)
with:
dEUi
dnj
> 0 for sj < s and
dEUi
dnj
< 0 for sj > s: (2.7)
In particular,
dEUi
dn1
> 0 and
dEUi
dnN
< 0: (2.8)
As we have seen in Proposition 2.2, the expected utility decreases in the
average skill level of the eld. Since all players of above average skill level act to
increase the average skill level, they must have a negative e¤ect on the expected
utility of the other players. The argument for players of below average skill is
analogous. Proposition 2.3 states that expected utility increases with the arrival
of additional players as long as their skill level sj is below the average skill level s.
We know that sj < s is always true for sj = s1 = smin, and therefore the expected
utility of players of all skill levels increases with the arrival of new competitors of
the lowest skill level. We also know that sj > s is always true for sj = sN = smax
and therefore expected prots of players of all skill levels decrease with the arrival
of new competitors of the highest skill level.
However, it is not clear how the arrival of new competitors of skill level s1 <
sj < sN a¤ects the expected utility of the other players, as they could either
increase or decrease the average quality of the eld, which would increase or
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decrease expected utility. Hence the e¤ect of additional players does not depend
on their absolute skill level but rather on their skill level relative to the average
skill of the current eld. An additional player with a particular absolute skill level
sj may be below or above the average skill level of the current eld, depending
on the composition of the player pool at that moment. Hence, from the point
of view of any given player, it does not matter that much if the newcomer is of
higher or lower skill level than himself, he only cares about how the newcomers
skill level relates to the average of the eld. This has important implications.
First, it is possible that players welcome the arrival of more and even better
players, which sounds counter-intuitive at rst. However, as long as they do not
increase the average skill level of the eld, their additional buy-ins more than
compensate for the increased competition they represent to the other players.
Second, it is possible that very skilled players are not happy about the arrival of
inferior players, even though this increases the prize pool. If the additional player
is above average skill, his additional buy-in does not compensate the other players
for the decrease in their winning probabilities. Hence, the additional player has
a negative overall e¤ect even on the very best players who have the biggest skill
advantage and therefore the highest chance of winning the tournament. The
participation externalities are illustrated in the gure below.
is
s
positive externalities negative externalities
mins maxs
Figure 2.1: Participation Externalities
2.5 Game Selection
We next turn to the case where players can choose to participate in di¤erent
tournaments with di¤erent buy-in levels. We assume that each player can only
play one tournament at a time. We look at the trade-o¤s involved in the players
game selection. This gives rise to interesting questions: is it optimal to play
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in a game where one enjoys the greatest skill-edge over the competition? Do
players of di¤erent skill levels have di¤erent optimal buy-in levels? Will players
of comparable skill compete in the same tournaments? We look at the players
optimal decisions, the participation patterns in equilibrium and illustrate this
with an example.
In the model setup, we have distinguished between two types of players, pro-
fessional players and amateur players, the di¤erence between the two being that
the former only care about the monetary benets associated with playing in a
tournament whereas the latter derive some non-monetary utility from participat-
ing. Since the two types have di¤erent objective functions, they will also behave
di¤erently when it comes to game selection. We now examine the di¤erences in
the game selection of professionals and amateurs.
2.5.1 The Professionals Decision
Suppose that there are several tournaments with di¤erent buy-in levels B: The
expected average skill levels at each buy-in level are denoted by se(B). We have
assumed that all players have rational expectations about the expected average
skill level at each buy-in level. The professionals expected utility of participating
is given by
EUPi = (
si
se(B)
  1)B (2.9)
and depends on the buy-in and his own skill relative to the expected average
skill at a given buy-in level. The player chooses the buy-in level that maximizes
his expected utility.
Proposition 2.4 The derivative of the expected utility function with respect to
the buy-in is given by
dEUPi
dB
= si(
se(B)  se0(B)B
(se(B))2
)  1: (2.10)
This implies the following for the professionals game selection decision:
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1) He will always play in the highest buy-in games if the expected average skill is
decreasing in the buy-in level, that is, se0(B) < 0:
2) He will always play in the lowest buy-in games if the expected average skill
is increasing and linear or convex in the buy-in level, that is se0(B) > 0 and
se00(B)  0:
3) There can only be an interior solution if the expected average skill is increasing
and concave in the buy-in level, that is, se0(B) > 0 and se00(B) < 0:
First, consider the case in which the average skill level decreases in the buy-in
level, that is se0(B) < 0 and the expected utility strictly increases in the buy-in
level, that is,
dEUPi
dB
> 0: Here, players would choose to play in the highest possible
game. Playing in the high stakes game would be a free lunch: higher potential
prots and worse competition. However, it seems natural that the average skill
increases in the stakes, that is se0(B) > 0.
Next, consider se0(B) > 0 and se(B)   se0(B)B  0: Here, the relationship
between the average skill level and the buy-in level is positive and linear/convex,
that is se0(B) > 0 and se00(B)  0: As buy-ins increase, the competition becomes
over-proportionately tougher, meaning that the higher potential winnings in the
higher stakes game do not compensate for the drastic reduction in skill edge. We
have
dEUPi
dB
< 0 and the expected prot decreases in the buy-in. Hence, players
would elect to play at the lowest buy-in games available.
Finally, consider se0(B) > 0 and se(B)   se0(B)B > 0: Here, the average
skill level is increasing and concave in the buy-in level, that is, se0(B) > 0 and
se00(B) < 0: In the higher buy-in games, the average skill level of the competition
still increases, but less rapidly than the buy-in levels, meaning that the higher
potential winnings in the higher stakes game compensate for the reduction in
skill edge. Only under these conditions,
dEUPi
dB
!
= 0 is possible and there can be
an interior solution.
We are interested in situations with interior solutions, because in reality we can
observe that players choose games at all levels, not only at the highest or lowest
ones available7. For the remainder of the chapter, we only consider situations
7At PokerStars, the worlds largest online poker room, there are up to 150,000 players
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where the expected average skill is increasing and concave in the buy-in level.
From now on, we assume se(B) = Bc with c < 1: Di¤erentiating the expected
prot EUPi =
 
si
Bc
  1B with respect to B yields the optimal buy-in level BPi
for a player of skill si.
Proposition 2.5 If the expected average skill is given by se(B) = Bc with c < 1,
the optimal buy-in level of a professional is given by
BPi = ((1  c)si)1=c : (2.11)
The optimal buy-in level increases in the own skill level, that is
dBPi
dsi
> 0: (2.12)
Our result shows that the optimal buy-in level increases in the skill level of
the player. This is in line with empirical observations: players with a higher
skill level tend to participate in higher buy-in tournaments, because the higher
prize money compensates for the tougher competition. Players with a lower skill
level tend to participate in lower buy-in tournaments, since the weak competition
compensates for the smaller prize pools.
2.5.2 The Amateurs Decision
We will now analyze the game selection problem of an amateur, who derives some
non-monetary utility v (B) > 0 from playing. His expected utility of participating
is given by
EUAi = (
si
se(B)
  1)B + v (B) : (2.13)
We are still only interested in the case in which se(B)   se0(B)B > 0 holds
and the expected average skill level is increasing and concave in the buy-in level.
The player chooses the buy-in level that maximizes his expected utility.
playing simultaneously at buy-in levels ranging from $ 0.1 to $ 100,000. Most of the players are
playing the lower-stakes games.
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Proposition 2.6 The derivative of the expected utility function with respect to
the buy-in is given by
dEUAi
dB
= si(
se(B)  se0(B)B
(se(B))2
) + v0(B)  1: (2.14)
This implies the following for the amateurs game selection decision:
1) He will always play in the highest games available if v0(B) > 1:
2) An interior solution is only possible for v0(B) < 1:
The intuition is as follows. If v0(B) > 1, the increase in non-monetary utility
would always outweigh the higher costs and possible expected monetary losses
in the more expensive, more di¢ cult game. As a result, amateurs would play in
innitely high games So there is only a trade-o¤ in game selection if v0(B) < 1.
We now determine the optimal buy-in level. Again, we assume se(B) = Bc;
with c < 1: We further assume a linear relationship between the non-monetary
utility v and B which is given by v(B) = B;  < 1: Di¤erentiating the expected
prot EUAi =
 
si
Bc
  (1  )B with respect to B yields the optimal buy-in level
BAi for a player of skill si.
Proposition 2.7 For an amateur player, the optimal buy-in level is given by
BAi =

(1  c) si
(1  )
1=c
: (2.15)
The optimal buy-in level increases in the own skill level, that is,
dBAi
dsi
> 0 (2.16)
and in the factor of non-monetary utility, that is,
dBAi
d
> 0: (2.17)
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2.5.3 An illustrative example
Consider a situation with 5 amateur players and 5 professional players. There
are ve skill levels si = i with i = 1; 2; 3; 4; 5: Let Pi and Ai be a professional
(amateur) of skill level si: There is one amateur and one professional player at
each skill level, that is, nPi = nAi = 1: Suppose that there are two tournaments
TL; TH with di¤erent buy-ins BL = 2 and BH = 5: Each player can choose one of
three actions a 2 f0; L;Hg with
a = 0: the player does not play in any tournament
a = L: the player plays in TL
a = H: the player plays in TH :
Let aeP i (a
e
Ai) be the expected participation decision of a professional (amateur)
player of skill level i, with aei 2 f0; L;Hg and let aPi; aAi be the optimal actions
in equilibrium given the expected actions of all other players.
Suppose that the expected participation decisions of all players are given by:
aeP1 = a
e
P2
= 0; aeP3 = a
e
P4
= L; aeP5 = H (2.18)
aeA1 = L; a
e
A2
= aeA3 = a
e
A4
= aeA5 = H: (2.19)
We assume that v(B) = 0:7B: The expected utility of an amateur player is then
given by
EUAi = si
 
NX
i=1
ni=
NX
i=1
nisi
!
=B   (1  )B =

si
se(B)
  0:3

B (2.20)
and the expected utility of a professional player is given by
EUPi =

si
se(B)
  1

B: (2.21)
Given the expected actions of the other players, each player chooses the game
that maximizes his expected utility.
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Proposition 2.8 Given the set of expectations, all players correctly anticipate
the equilibrium average skill levels of seL = 2:87 and s
e
H = 3:8: Players P1 and P2
choose not to play in any tournament, A1; P3 and P4 choose to play in the low
buy-in tournament and A2; A3; A4; A5 and P5 choose to play in the high buy-
in tournament. The playersequilibrium choices are consistent with the expected
actions.
The players correctly anticipate the equilibrium average skill levels at each
buy-in. Given these expectations, no player has an incentive to deviate from
the expected actions in equilibrium. If A1 does not play in TL, P3 would no
longer nd it protable to play in this game and leave. If A2 were to play in TL,
this game would become so attractive that P5 would elect to play in the smaller
stakes game. However these would again cause other players to switch games are
therefore no stable equilibria.
2.5.4 Participation pattern in equilibrium
In this section, we discuss the playersparticipation patterns in equilibrium and
analyze the role of the so-called "losing amateurs" and the role of non-monetary
benets.
In equilibrium, some of the potential players choose to participate in a tour-
nament while others do not nd it protable to do so. None of the participating
players has an incentive to leave his current game. At any given buy-in level, the
participants consist of professional players and amateur players. All the partici-
pating professionals are of above average skill. Otherwise, their expected utility
would be negative and they would not participate. Among the amateur players
participating in the tournament there are some players of above and some players
of below average skill. We will call those who are of above average skill "winning
amateurs" since their skill edge allows them to make a monetary prot from play-
ing in addition to the non-monetary benets of playing. We will call those who
are of below average skill "losing amateurs". They incur monetary losses from
playing but still nd it worthwhile to participate because of the non-monetary
benets.
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Let us look at the role of the losing amateurs. As we know, professionals will
only play if they have a skill edge, so there must be some participants in the
game who are of below average skill and therefore expected losers in this game,
at least monetary-wise. The presence of these losing amateurs ensures that a
certain number of professionals nds it worthwhile playing. Without the losing
amateurs, the games would be unprotable for all but the very best professional
players.
The participation decision of the amateur players crucially depends on the
non-monetary benets v(B): These benets may induce amateurs to participate
in a tournament even when they are of below average skill and therefore expected
losers monetary-wise. If v(B) is very high, even amateurs of very low skill nd it
worthwhile to play which decreases the average skill level and makes the games
more attractive for amateurs and professionals alike. If v(B) is very small, only
the highly-skilled amateurs and, as a result, only the very best professionals will
nd it worthwhile playing, while all other players of inferior skill will choose not
to participate.
2.6 Tournament Design
In this section, we look at the tournaments from the perspective of the tour-
nament organizer. We assume that the organizers goal is to sort players into
di¤erent tournaments according to their skill levels. While skill levels are com-
mon knowledge among the players, the tournament organizer cannot distinguish
between the di¤erent types8. We look at the case in which the tournament or-
ganizer o¤ers two tournaments with di¤erent buy-in levels and show that he can
achieve self-selection of the players by setting the correct ratio of buy-in levels.
As we have argued before, in each game the presence of some losing amateurs
is crucial. If an organizer o¤ers two tournaments with di¤erent buy-in levels
and wants to attract the desired number of players, he must ensure that the low
buy-in tournament is just attractive enough for some low-skilled amateur to be
8This assumption is widely used in the literature. See Clark and Riis (2001).
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the losing player in this game. However, it must not be too attractive, because
otherwise some amateurs of higher skill who are the crucial losing amateurs in
the higher buy-in game could decide to play the low buy-in game instead. The
migration of these amateurs from the high stakes game to the low stakes game
could lead to the collapse of the high stakes game, as the absence of the crucial
losing players could make the game too tough even for the professional of highest
skill. This, in turn, could also lead to the collapse of the low-stakes game, as the
players of the highest skill level would move down to the low stakes game which
would give the weaker players in the low-stakes game incentives to play in the
now-deserted high-stakes game, which would again attract the strong players to
play in the high-stakes game which would drive out the weak players and so on.
There would be no stable equilibrium in which the players of di¤erent skill levels
have no incentive to leave their current game.
We have argued before that if an organizer wants di¤erent tournaments with
di¤erent buy-in levels to be sustainable, it is of major importance to give the "los-
ing amateurs" the right incentives to play in the game where they are "needed".
Suppose that there are two di¤erent tournaments Tk, k = H;L , with BH > BL
and the expected average skill levels seH > s
e
L. Let us assume that the organizer
has identied the players of skill levels sj 1 and sj; with sj > sj 1; to be the
crucial losing amateurs and that he wants the players of skill level sj to play
the role of losing amateur in tournament TH and the players of skill level sj 1
to play the role of losing amateur in tournament TL. Our analysis focuses on
the crucial losing amateurs. In order to achieve self-selection of the types, the
buy-ins BH ; BL must be set such that the following participation and incentive
constraints are fullled.
EUAj(TH)  0
 
PCAj

(2.22)
EUAj 1(TL)  0
 
PCAj 1

(2.23)
EUAj(TH) > EU
A
j
(TL)
 
ICAj

(2.24)
EUAj 1(TL) > EU
A
j 1(TH)
 
ICAj 1

(2.25)
By setting di¤erent buy-in levels, the tournament organizer determines the play-
ers incentives to participate in a particular tournament and can achieve self-
selection by choosing the correct ratio of buy-in levels BH
BL
.
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Proposition 2.9 The tournament organizer can achieve self-selection by setting
a ratio
BH
BL
>
seH
seL
sj   (1  )seL
sj   (1  )seH
for sj 1   (1  )seH < 0 (2.26)
and a ratio
seH
seL
sj   (1  )seL
sj   (1  )seH
<
BH
BL
<
seH
seL
sj 1   (1  )seL
sj 1   (1  )seH
for sj 1   (1  )seH > 0:
(2.27)
Given these buy-in levels, the players with skill level sj 1 nd it optimal to
play in the low-stakes game. By moving to the high-stakes game, they would enjoy
more non-monetary utility, but this would be more than o¤set by the monetary
losses due to the higher buy-ins and the tougher competition in the high stakes
game. The players with skill level sj enjoy such a high level of non-monetary
utility at the high stakes game that they nd it optimal to stay there even though
moving down would increase their monetary benets. If the ratio between the
buy-in levels is set correctly, the players have no incentive to leave their current
games and therefore the games are stable.
If the ratio were chosen incorrectly, the tournaments would no longer be stable,
as players would then have incentives to leave their current game for another or
not to play at all. Too small a ratio could entice amateur players of skill level
sj 1 to move to the high stakes game, since, if the spread in buy-in is small, the
higher monetary losses in the high stakes game would be o¤set by the increase
in non-monetary utility. This could cause the low buy-in game to collapse. Too
big a ratio could entice amateur players of skill level sj to move to the low stakes
game, since their monetary losses in the high-stakes game would be too high. The
migration of these players could make the high-stakes game collapse.
This shows that the organizer can achieve self-selection of the types, but needs
to be careful in setting the correct ratio between the di¤erent buy-in levels. Play-
ers with higher skill level will play in higher buy-in tournaments and truthfully
reveal their ability.
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Another illustrative example
Again, consider our example from Section 3.5.3. The equilibrium average skill
levels were given by se(B = 2) = 2:87 and se(B = 5) = 3:8: Players A1; P3 and
P4 elect to play in tournament TL; players A2; A3; A4 A5 and P5 play in TL and
players P1 and P2 do not play at all. Now suppose that the tournament organizer
has yet to determine the buy-ins for the two tournaments but wants players to
self-select in the same way as when BL = 2 and BH = 5: What is the ratio
between the two buy-in levels that achieves self-selection in that manner?
As we have argued before, the key agents are the losing amateurs in each
game. As we have shown in Section 3.5.3, players will self-select as described
above when A1 plays in the low buy-in tournament and A2 plays in the high
buy-in tournament. The organizer must now set the buy-in levels in way that
ensures that A1 and A2 play in the games they are supposed to. First, look
at the expression sj 1   (1   )seH from Proposition 2.9. Inserting  = 0:7;
sj 1 = 1 and seH = 3:8 yields 1   0:3  3:8 < 0; hence self-selection is achieved
for BH
BL
>
seH
seL
sj (1 )seL
sj (1 )seH : Inserting  = 0:7; sj = 2; s
e
L = 2:87 and s
e
H = 3:8 yields
BH
BL
> 1:99:
Hence, if the buy-in for tournament TH is at least 1.99 as large as the buy-in
for tournament TL;this ensures that A1 plays in TL and that A2 plays in TH : The
presence of the losing amateurs in these games ensures that the other players self-
select in the desired manner. Hence, for BH
BL
> 1:99; we have aP1 ; aP3 ; aP4 = L;
aA2 ; aA3 ; aA4 aA5 ; aP5 = H and s
e
L = 2:87 and s
e
H = 3:8:
2.7 Conclusion
We have built a model of buy-in tournaments and analyzed some of their main
properties. In particular, we have focused on participation externalities, the
playersgame selection in equilibrium and the selection properties of buy-in tour-
naments. We nd that whether a particular player increases or decreases the
other playersexpected utility does not depend on his absolute skill level, but on
his skill level relative to the average of the eld. In particular, he will increase
the other playersexpected utility if he is of below average skill and decreases
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the other playersexpected utility if he is of above average skill. Moreover, we
show that players have an incentive to truthfully reveal their skill level by choos-
ing optimal buy-in levels that are increasing in the players skill levels if the
tournament organizer chooses a correct ratio between the buy-in levels and some
conditions about the relationships between the expected average skill level, the
non-monetary utility and the buy-in levels hold.
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2.8 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2.1:
The winning probabilities of all players add up to one, that is
NX
i=1
nipi = 1: (2.28)
All winning probabilities can be expressed as multiples of the winning probability
pmin of the player of lowest skill level s1, that is pi = sipmin. Inserting pi = sipmin
into
NX
i=1
nipi = 1 gives
pmin = 1=
NX
i=1
nisi (2.29)
and
pi = si=
NX
i=1
nisi: (2.30)
Di¤erentiating the winning probability pj of a particular player of skill sj with
respect to his own skill level sj gives
dpj
dsj
=
NX
i=1
nisi   nj
(
NX
i=1
nisi)2
: (2.31)
As
NX
i=1
nisi   nj > 0; it follows that
dpj
dsj
> 0: (2.32)
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Di¤erentiating pj with respect to all other skill levels si6=j gives
dpj
dsi
=
 
NX
i=1
ni
(
NX
i=1
nisi)2
< 0 for i 6= j: (2.33)
Di¤erentiating pj with respect to the number of participants at skill level ni yields
dpj
dni
=
 
NX
i=1
si
(
NX
i=1
nisi)2
< 0 for n = 1; :::; N: (2.34)
Proof of Proposition 2.2:
When entering a given tournament, a participant will win the rst prize P = nTB
with probability pi. Using the expression for the winning probability from
Proposition 2.1, deducting the buy-in B and taking into account the non-
monetary benets v(B), the expected utility from playing in the tournament
is given by EUi = piP + v(B)   B: Using pi = si=
NX
i=1
nisi, P = B
NX
i=1
ni and
s =
NX
i=1
nisi=
NX
i=1
ni gives
EUi =
si
s
  1

B + v(B): (2.35)
Remember that v(B) = 0 for professional players. A professional player only
plays when his expected utility is positive. Note that EUAi > 0 is equivalent to
si > s; which must always hold for a professional to participate.
Di¤erentiating EUi with respect to the own skill level si gives
dEUi
dsi
=
B
s
> 0: (2.36)
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Di¤erentiating EUi with respect to the average skill level s gives
dEUi
ds
=   siB
(s)2
< 0: (2.37)
Proof of Proposition 2.3:
Expected utility is given by EUi = ( sis   1)B+ v(B): Di¤erentiating with respect
to the number of players nj of skill level sj gives
dEUi
dnj
=  siB
s2
ds
dnj
: (2.38)
Note that ds
dsj
= (sj   s) =
NX
i=1
ni: Hence
dEUi
dnj
=  siB
s2
(sj   s) =
NX
i=1
ni: (2.39)
It follows that
dEUi
dnj
> 0 for sj < s and
dEUi
dnj
< 0 for sj > s: (2.40)
Note further that
dEUi
dn1
> 0 (2.41)
since s1 < s and
dEUi
dnN
< 0 (2.42)
since sN > s:
Proof of Proposition 2.4:
Di¤erentiating the expected utility of a professional player EUPi = (
si
se(B)
  1)B
with respect to the buy-in level B gives
dEUPi
dB
= si(
se(B)  se0(B)B
(se(B))2
)  1: (2.43)
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The sign of the derivative is determined by se(B)   se0(B)B: We consider two
cases:
Case (1): se0(B) < 0
Note that
dEUPi
dB
> 0 is equivalent to
sis
e(B)  se(B)2   sise0(B)B > 0: (2.44)
We know that si > se(B); since professionals only play in games where they have
an edge, because otherwise, their expected utility from playing would be negative.
Hence, sise(B)  se(B)2 > 0: Since se0(B) < 0; it follows that
dEUPi
dB
> 0 (2.45)
and the player will always choose the game with the highest buy-in level.
Case (2): se0(B) > 0
Note that
dEUPi
dB
can be expressed as
dEUPi
dB
=
siB
(se(B))2
(
se(B)
B
  se0(B))  1 (2.46)
:Note further that the sign of dEU
P
i
dB
crucially depends on the term s
e(B)
B
  se0(B):
(a) If s
e(B)
B
= se0(B), se is linear in B and hence
se00(B) = 0: (2.47)
(b) If s
e(B)
B
< se0(B), se(B) is increasing and convex in B and hence
se00(B) > 0: (2.48)
(c) If s
e(B)
B
> se0(B), se(B) is increasing and concave in B and hence
se00(B) < 0: (2.49)
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Clearly, if se00(B)  0, then dEUPi
dB
< 0 and the player will always choose the game
with the lowest buy-in level.
If se00(B) < 0, the sign of
dEUPi
dB
is ambiguous. Hence, an interior solution at
dEUPi
dB
= 0 can only exist for se0(B) > 0 and se00(B) < 0:
Further, note that
(1) dEU
P
i
dB B=0
> 0 is equivalent to si > se(B) which always holds for professional
players.
(2) dEU
P
i
dB
< 0 is equivalent to s
e0(B)
se(B)=B
+ s
e(B)
si
> 1. Hence, dEU
P
i
dB B!1 < 0:
Proof of Proposition 2.5:
Di¤erentiating the expected prot EUPi =
 
si
Bc
  1B with respect to B gives
dEUPi
dB
= (1  c)siB c   1 != 0: (2.50)
Solving for B gives the optimal buy-in level
BPi = ((1  c)si)1=c : (2.51)
Di¤erentiating BPi with respect to si yields
dBPi
dsi
=
1
csi
(si (1  c))
1
c > 0: (2.52)
Proof of Proposition 2.6:
Di¤erentiating the expected prot
EUAi =

si
se(B)
  1

B + v(B) (2.53)
with respect to B yields the optimal buy-in level Bi for an amateur player of skill
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si. The rst order condition is given by
dEUAi
dB
= si(
se(B)  se0(B)B
(se(B))2
) + v0(B)  1:
Since we are only interested in cases in which se(B) is increasing and concave
in B; that is se(B)   se0(B)B > 0; we have dEUAi
dB
> 0 for v0(B) > 1: Hence for
v0(B) > 1; amateur players will always play in the highest games. Note that an
interior solution at
dEUAi
dB
= 0 only exists for v0(B) < 1 and is given by argmax
EUAi(B):
Proof of Proposition 2.7:
Again, we consider the case in which se(B) = Bc: We further assume a linear
relationship between v and B and set v(B) = B with 0 <  < 1 in order to
ensure an interior solution. Solving
dEUAi
dB
= 0 for B yields the optimal buy-in
level
BAi =

(1  c) si
1  
1=c
(2.54)
Note that
dBAi
dsi
> 0 (2.55)
and
dBAi
d
> 0 (2.56)
clearly hold.
Proof of Proposition 2.8:
We consider the following expected participation decisions:
aeP1 = a
e
p2
= 0; aeP3 = a
e
P4
= L; aeP5 = H (2.57)
aeA1 = L; a
e
A2
= aeA3 = a
e
A4
= aeA5 = H: (2.58)
We assume that v(B) = 0:7B: The expected utility of an amateur player is then
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given by
EUAi = si
 
NX
i=1
ni=
NX
i=1
nisi
!
=B  B + v(B) =

si
se(B)
  0:3

B
and the expected utility of a professional player is given by
EUPi =

si
se(B)
  1

B:
Now we check if, given these expectations, any player has an incentive to deviate
from his expected behavior aei . A players optimal decision is denoted by a

i :
The expected utilities of the professional players are given by:
EUA1(aA1 = L; a
e
A2
= aeA3 = a
e
A4
= aeA5 = H; a
e
P1
= aep2 = 0; a
e
P3
= aeP4 = L;
aeP5 = H) =
 
13
1+3+4
  0:3 2 = 0:15
EUA1(aA1 = H; a
e
A2
= aeA3 = a
e
A4
= aeA5 = H; a
e
P1
= aep2 = 0; a
e
P3
= aeP4 = L; a
e
P5
=
H) =
 
16
1+2+3+4+25   0:3

5 = 0
Hence, aA1 = a
e
A1
= H:
EUA2(aA2 = L; a
e
A1
= L; aeA3 = a
e
A4
= aeA5 = H; a
e
P1
= aep2 = 0; a
e
P3
= aeP4 =
TL; a
e
P5
= H) =
 
24
1+2+3+4
  0:3 2 = 1
EUA2(aA2 = H; a
e
A1
= L; aeA3 = a
e
A4
= aeA5 = H; a
e
P1
= aep2 = 0; a
e
P3
= aeP4 =
TL; a
e
P5
= H) =
 
25
2+3+4+25   0:3

5 = 1:13
Hence, aA2 = a

A2
= H:
EUA3(aA3 = L; a
e
A1
= L; aeA2 = a
e
A4
= aeA5 = H; a
e
P1
= aep2 = 0; a
e
P3
= aeP4 =
L; aeP5 = H) = 1:58
EUA3(aA3 = H; a
e
A1
= L; aeA2 = a
e
A4
= aeA5 = H; a
e
P1
= aep2 = 0; a
e
P3
= aeP4 =
L; aeP5 = H) = 2:45
Hence, aA3 = a
e
A3
= H:
EUA4(aA4 = L; a
e
A1
= L; aeA2 = a
e
A3
= aeA5 = H; a
e
P1
= aep2 = 0; a
e
P3
= aeP4 =
L; aeP5 = H) = 2:01
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EUA4(aA4 = H; a
e
A1
= L; aeA2 = a
e
A3
= aeA5 = H; a
e
P1
= aep2 = 0; a
e
P3
= aeP4 =
L; aeP5 = H) = 3:76
Hence, aA4 = a
e
A4
= H:
EUA5(aA5 = L; a
e
A1
= L; aeA2 = a
e
A3
= aeA4 = H; a
e
P1
= aep2 = 0; a
e
P3
= aeP4 =
L; aeP5 = H) = 2:48
EUA5(aA5 = H; a
e
A1
= L; aeA2 = a
e
A3
= aeA4 = H; a
e
P1
= aep2 = 0; a
e
P3
= aeP4 =
L; aeP5 = H) = 5:08
Hence, aA5 = a
e
A5
= H:
The expected utilities of the professional players are given by:
EUP1(aP1 = 0; a
e
p2
= 0; aeP3 = a
e
P4
= L; aeP5 = H; a
e
A1
= L; aeA2 = a
e
A3
= aeA4 =
aeA5 = H) = 0:
EUP1(aP1 = L; a
e
p2
= 0; aeP3 = a
e
P4
= L; aeP5 = H; a
e
A1
= L; aeA2 = a
e
A3
= aeA4 =
aeA5 = H) =
 
14
21+3+4   1

2 =  10
9
:
EUP1(aP1 = H; a
e
p2
= 0; aeP3 = a
e
P4
= L; aeP5 = H; a
e
A1
= L; aeA2 = a
e
A3
= aeA4 =
aeA5 = H) =
 
16
1+2+3+4+25   1

5 =  3:5:
Hence, aP1 = a
e
P1
= 0:
EUP2(ap2 = 0; a
e
P1
= 0; aeP3 = a
e
P4
= L; aeP5 = H; a
e
A1
= L; aeA2 = a
e
A3
= aeA4 =
aeA5 = H) = 0:
EUP2(ap2 = L; a
e
P1
= 0; aeP3 = a
e
P4
= L; aeP5 = H; a
e
A1
= L; aeA2 = a
e
A3
= aeA4 =
aeA5 = H) =  0:4:
EUP2(aP2 = H; a
e
P1
= 0; aeP3 = a
e
P4
= L; aeP5 = H; a
e
A1
= L; aeA2 = a
e
A3
= aeA4 =
aeA5 = H) =  2:14:
Hence, aP2 = a
e
p2
= 0:
EUP3(aP3 = 0; a
e
P1
= 0; aep2 = 0; a
e
P4
= L; aeP5 = H; a
e
A1
= L; aeA2 = a
e
A3
= aeA4 =
aeA5 = H) = 0:
EUP3(aP3 = L; a
e
P1
= 0; aep2 = 0; a
e
P4
= L; aeP5 = H; a
e
A1
= L; aeA2 = a
e
A3
= aeA4 =
aeA5 = H) = 0:25
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EUP3(aP3 = H; a
e
P1
= 0; aep2 = 0; a
e
P4
= L; aeP5 = H; a
e
A1
= L; aeA2 = a
e
A3
= aeA4 =
aeA5 = H) =  0:91:
Hence, aP3 = a
e
P3
= L:
EUP4(aP4 = L; a
e
P1
= 0; aep2 = 0; a
e
P3
= L; aeP5 = H; a
e
A1
= L; aeA2 = a
e
A3
= aeA4 =
aeA5 = H) = 1:
EUP4(aP3 = H; a
e
P1
= 0; aep2 = 0; a
e
P4
= L; aeP5 = H; a
e
A1
= L; aeA2 = a
e
A3
= aeA4 =
aeA5 = H) = 0:22:
Hence, aP4 = a
e
P4
= L:
EUP5(aP5 = L; a
e
P1
= 0; aep2 = 0; a
e
P3
= L; aeP4 = L; a
e
A1
= L; aeA2 = a
e
A3
= aeA4 =
aeA5 = H) = 1:08:
EUP5(aP5 = H; a
e
P1
= 0; aep2 = 0; a
e
P3
= L; aeP4 = L; a
e
A1
= L; aeA2 = a
e
A3
= aeA4 =
aeA5 = H) = 1:58:
Hence, aP5 = a
e
P5
= H:
Players correctly anticipate average skill level of se(B = 2) = 2:67 and se(B =
5) = 3:8 and select their games accordingly, in a way that is consistent with their
expectations.
Proof of Proposition 2.9:
The tournament organizer wants to choose BH ; BL in a way that gives an amateur
of skill level sj the right incentives to choose the high buy-in game TH and that
makes it rational for an amateur of skill level sj 1 to choose the low buy-in game
TL: Hence, participation and incentive constraints for both types must be fullled.
The participation constraints of the player of skill level sj and skill level sj 1 are
given by
EUAj (TH) =
sj
seH
BH  BH + BH  0
and
EUAj 1(TL) =
sj 1
seL
BL  BL + BL  0:
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The incentive constraints of the player of skill level sj and skill level sj 1 are
given by
EUAj (TH)  EUAj (TL); (2.59)
that is,
sj
seH
BH  BH + BH  sj
seL
BL  BL + BL (2.60)
and
EUAj 1(TL)  EUAj 1(TH); (2.61)
that is,
sj 1
seL
BL  BL + BL  sj 1
seH
BH  BH + BH : (2.62)
From EUAj (TH)  EUAj (TL); it follows that
BH
seH
(sj   (1  )seH) >
BL
seL
(sj   (1  )seL): (2.63)
Note that due to EUAj (TH)  0, it must be the case that sj  (1   )seH : As a
result, since seH > s
e
L, we have
sj   (1  )seL > sj   (1  )seH (2.64)
Hence, EUAj (TH)  EUAj (TL) can be rewritten as
BH
BL
>
seH
seL
sj   (1  )seL
sj   (1  )seH
: (2.65)
From EUAj 1(TL)  EUAj 1(TH); it follows that
BL
seL
(sj 1   (1  )seL) >
BH
seH
(sj 1   (1  )seH): (2.66)
Note that due to EUAj 1(TL)  0, it must hold that sj 1  (1   )seL: However,
the sign of sj 1   (1  )seH is ambiguous.
Case (1) sj 1 > (1  )seH :
In this case,
EUAj 1(TL)  EUAj 1(TH) (2.67)
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is equivalent to
BH
BL
<
seH
seL
sj 1   (1  )seL
sj 1   (1  )seH
: (2.68)
Incentive compatibility for both types is achieved for
seH
seL
sj   (1  )seL
sj   (1  )seH
<
BH
BL
<
seH
seL
sj 1   (1  )seL
sj 1   (1  )seH
:
Note that
seH
seL
sj 1   (1  )seL
sj 1   (1  )seH
>
seH
seL
sj   (1  )seL
sj   (1  )seH
(2.69)
is equivalent to
(1  ) (sj   sj 1) (seH   seL) > 0; (2.70)
which clearly holds.
Case (2) sj 1 < (1  )seH :
In this case,
EUAj 1(TL)  EUAj 1(TH) (2.71)
is equivalent to
BH
BL
>
seH
seL
sj 1   (1  )seL
sj 1   (1  )seH
; (2.72)
which is clearly fullled since the right hand side is negative. Hence only
EUAj (TH)  EUAj (TL) (2.73)
is binding and the organizer can achieve self-selection for
BH
BL
>
seH
seL
sj   (1  )seL
sj   (1  )seH
:
Chapter 3
Technology Theft in Joint
Ventures
3.1 Introduction
In recent years, world markets have increasingly been ooded by counterfeited
products. Their widespread availability represents a major concern for the com-
panies that have invested great resources in creating innovative technologies and
unique intellectual property, only to see product pirates reap part of the bene-
ts. While simple consumer and media goods have traditionally been subject to
product piracy, today even highly sophisticated technological products are being
copied and sold internationally. Name any major brand and chances are that
there is a counterfeit version of it somewhere. According to the World Customs
Organization, counterfeiting accounts for 5 to 7 percent of global merchandise
trade, equivalent to lost sales of as much as US$ 512 billion in 2004. China is
widely considered to be the main culprit in the international business of coun-
terfeiting and piracy, as counterfeited products account for a large share of the
nations GDP.
At the origin of the technology theft is often a multinationals decision to enter
a country with little intellectual property rights enforcement. The multinationals
entry makes it much easier for the counterfeiting rms to get hold of prototypes
or blueprints of the products that they want to copy. In order to enter a de-
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veloping market, multinationals often need to form a joint venture with a local
company. This may be a voluntary decision, because multinationals often lack
local capabilities such as personnel, contacts, language skills, market knowledge
or distribution networks. However, the decision to form a joint venture could
also be a forced upon the multinational by the host country government. This
occurs in industries that are of great importance to the local government (na-
tional security, transport, utilities) and where it does not want to cede control
to foreign companies. Another reason why local governments may insist on joint
ventures is that they want to force a know-how transfer from the multinational
to the local partner. Hence, joint ventures can be used as means of acquiring the
latest technology and management skills. Once the local rm has acquired the
multinationals know-how, it is in prime position to break up the joint venture
and compete with the multinational. Thus, if the multinational engages in the
joint venture, it potentially contributes to the emergence of a new competitor.
The loss in sales caused by pirated goods is not limited to the multinationals
sales in the country where the copies originate from. Multinationals increasingly
face competition from counterfeited products in their home markets: almost exact
copies of the multinationals products can be found in the open market, at trade
shows or in product catalogues. Hence, multinationals need to take into account
the potential damage of pirated products not only in the foreign market but
especially in their home markets.
A natural question to ask is why multinationals keep on being active in mar-
kets like China if that means exposing their technology to potential theft. Some
multinational executives point at the sheer size and the rapid growth of the
Chinese market, while others want to take advantage of the cheap labor costs
and other producer-friendly conditions in order to signicantly reduce their pro-
duction cost and gain a competitive advantage. We will look at both market
expansion and cost reduction as possible motives for multinational entry. We
are particularly interested in how the level of domestic competition a¤ects the
multinationals incentives to enter a foreign market.
Our work is related to di¤erent strands of literature. International trade the-
ory examines the motives and the optimal modes for multinational entry. Another
focus of study is the e¤ect of spillovers on the rmsincentives to enter cooperative
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agreements and on the host country in general. Contract theory studies incen-
tives problems within joint ventures. Our work is also related to the industrial
organization literature on innovation and market structure. We contribute to the
literature by establishing a model of foreign market entry, technology theft and
competition Our main idea is that foreign market may create a new competitor
which increases competitive pressure in the multinationals home market.
In our model, we consider a multinational that can enter a foreign market
through a joint venture with a local rm. The multinational is aware of the risk
that the local company may copy its technology and become a competitor not
only in the foreign market, but also in the home market. We rst study the
joint venture relationship between the two rms. In particular, we are interested
in the question whether the multinational wants to implement cooperation by
the local by o¤ering a one-time payment. We then look at the multinationals
incentives to enter the foreign market, if it knows that this will create a new
competitor in both the foreign and its home market. We consider two motives
for entry: market expansion and cost reduction. We are especially interested in
how domestic competitive pressure a¤ects the multinationals entry decision.
We rst analyze the joint venture relationship between the multinational and
the local company. We look at the local companys incentive problem, as to
whether it should remain the multinationals partner or become a competitor.
We nd that the multinational can implement cooperative behavior by the local
company by paying a su¢ ciently high share of the joint venture prots in the
foreign market if these are relatively large compared to the potential prots in
the home market. The latter are decreasing in the number of domestic rms. We
show that the fewer rms there are in the home market; the more attractive it is
for the local company to enter and the more costly it becomes for the multina-
tional to implement cooperation. However, the multinational also has a higher
incentive to implement cooperation and protect its home markets if there are only
few competitors and prots are high. We show that for very low levels of com-
petition, the multinationals incentives to protect the home market exceed the
local companys entry incentives and the multinational always nds it protable
to implement cooperation if it is a monopolist the home market: For higher levels
of competition, the local companys entry incentives exceed the multinationals
incentives to protect the home market. However, we show that overall, the multi-
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national is more likely to implement cooperation if the number of domestic rms
high.
We then look at the multinationals entry decision if it knows that entry will
inevitably create a new competitor. We nd that the multinationals entry incen-
tives are very di¤erent depending on whether its entry motive is market expansion
or cost reduction. If the multinationals motive for entry is market expansion, it
is more likely to enter the foreign market the higher domestic competition, since
in this case, the negative impact of the local company becoming a competitor
would be smaller.
In the cost reduction case, we nd that both the costs and benets of entering
the foreign market are decreasing in the number of domestic rms. The overall
e¤ect depends on the margins in the home market and on the degree of cost
reduction. We show that if margins in the home market are low, the multina-
tionals entry incentives are increasing and concave in the number of domestic
rms. However if margins are high, the multinationals entry incentives are high-
est for intermediate levels of domestic competition and decreasing as competition
increases. Our results suggest that in the case of market expansion and in the
case of cost reduction when home market margins are low, multinationals should
nd foreign market entry most attractive when domestic competition is high. In
the case of cost reduction when home market margins are high, multinationals
should nd foreign market entry most attractive for intermediate levels of domes-
tic competition.
Our work also makes an interesting contribution to the literature on innova-
tion and market structure. Our work also contributes an interesting aspect to the
literature of innovation and market structure. In most of the literature, the costs
of innovation include expenses for patents, licences and/or research and devel-
opment. These costs are usually xed and independent of the market structure.
In our model, entering the foreign market creates a new competitor in the home
market, which alters the market structure and increases competitive pressure.
Hence, the cost of pursuing the cost-reducing innovation is not a monetary ex-
pense, but the emergence of a new competitor. The cost of entry is the negative
impact of the new competitor and depends on the market structure at home.
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3.2 Related Literature
Our work is related to di¤erent strands of literature ranging from international
trade theory to the economics of innovation and market structure.
There exists a strand of literature that analyzes spillovers in joint ventures.
Blomström and Sjöholm (1999) argue that the interaction between multinationals
and local rms facilitates spillovers and that this might reduce the multinationals
incentives to cooperate. Müller and Schnitzer (2006) analyze a multinationals
incentives to engage in a joint venture if this gives rise to technology spillovers.
They show that spillovers do not necessarily have a negative e¤ect on the incen-
tives to transfer technology and that a joint venture may not always be in the
host country governments best interest, even if it could potentially benet from
the spillovers.
Since we focus on domestic competitive pressure as the main determinant of
the multinationals entry decision, our work is related to the large literature on
innovation and market structure. Various papers have analyzed the link between
a rms incentives to innovate and the intensity of competition. There are dif-
ferent measures for the intensity of competition. According to Arrow (1962),
the main determinant is the number of rms in a given industry and competi-
tion is more intense the higher the number of rms. Aghion, Harris and Vickers
(1995) emphasize the mode of competition, rather than the number of rms,
They argue that Cournot competition is less intense than Bertrand competition,
since Cournot competition normally leads to lower output and higher prices than
Bertrand competition. Boone (2000) denes a number of axioms that a good
measure of market competition must satisfy. He lists the switch from Cournot
to Bertrand competition and a reduction in travel costs on a Hotelling Beach as
well-known examples of such parameterizations of competition.
The literature mainly focuses on cost-reducing innovation. Delbono and Deni-
colo (1990) show that, under the assumption of a homogenous product, the in-
centive to introduce cost-reducing innovation is greater for a Bertrand competitor
than for a Cournot competitor. Bonnano and Haworth (1998) use a model of hor-
izontal di¤erentiation à la Mussa and Rosen (1978) and show that the increase in
Technology Theft in Joint Ventures 69
prots associated with any given cost reduction is higher in the case of Cournot
competition than in the case of Bertrand competition, no matter how small the
degree of di¤erentiation. They nd that there are cost-reducing innovations that
would be pursued under Cournot competition but not under Bertrand Competi-
tion. Bester and Petrakis (1993) also consider the case of di¤erentiated products
and obtain a mixed result: if the degree of di¤erentiation is "large", the incen-
tive to introduce a cost-reducing innovation is higher for the Cournot competitor,
while if the degree of di¤erentiation is "small", then the incentive is higher for a
Cournot competitor.
Another related strand of literature concerns horizontal and vertical foreign
direct investment (FDI). The literature on horizontal FDI addresses the multi-
nationals market expansion motives. The multinational must decide whether
it wants to serve the foreign market with exports from the home market which
involves transport costs or whether it wants to set up a production facility in
the foreign market, which involves a xed cost. Important contributions have
been made by Brainard (1997) or Helpman et al. (2004). The literature on verti-
cal FDI addresses the multinationals cost-reducing motives. Vertical FDI takes
place when the multinational fragments the production process internationally,
locating each stage of the production where it can be done at least cost. Gross-
mann and Helpman (2002, 2003) have recently made important contributions in
this eld.
3.3 The Model
Consider a multinational enterprise that is currently selling a single good in its
home market A and is considering entering a foreign market B. We assume that in
market A, there are n symmetric rms producing the good at constant marginal
cost c: There are no xed costs. Consumer demand in market A is given by
pA(qA) = aA   qA: The n rms compete in quantities à la Cournot.
We assume that only the multinational enterprise has the option of entering
market B. We consider two motives for entry, market expansion and cost reduc-
tion. In the market expansion case, the multinational can expand its market
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reach and sell its product in both markets A and B. Consumer demand in market
B is given by pB(qB) = aB  qB: In the cost reduction case, the multinational can
lower its marginal cost from c to c0 with c0 < c and gain a competitive advantage
in its home market. We analyze both cases separately, so the multinationals
motivation is either market expansion or cost reduction, but never both at the
same time.
In our model, the only mode of entry into market B is via a joint venture
with a local company. We assume that there is only one potential joint venture
partner and that if both rms cooperate, they are the only supplier of the good
in market B and share the joint prot. Let  (1  ) be the share of the joint
prot that the local rm (multinational) receives, with 0    1: In case the
rms do not cooperate, they engage in Cournot competition.
There are two periods t = 1; 2. In t = 1 the multinational can either enter
market B through a joint venture with the local company or stay in its home
market A. We assume that the multinational can only enter market B in t = 1:
In t = 2, the multinational continues to operate in all the markets in which it was
active in t = 1. We assume that if the multinational decides to enter market B,
the local company is always willing to cooperate with the multinational in t = 1
and receives a share 0 < 1 < 1 of the joint prots.
At the start of t = 2, the local company has to decide whether it wants to
remain the multinationals partner or become a competitor instead. We assume
that if the multinational and the local company cooperate in t = 1, the local com-
pany has access to all production and business processes of the multinational, so
that in t = 2 it is able to produce and sell a perfect substitute of the multina-
tionals product in both markets A and B: We assume that if the local company
decides to compete with the multinational in t = 2; it can instantly enter both
markets without entry or transport costs. In market A, the emergence of the
local company as a new competitor would increase the number of rms from n
to n+ 1. In market B; there would be a duopoly between the multinational and
the local company.
At the start of t = 2; the multinational can o¤er the local company a share
0  2  1 of the joint venture prots to be made in market B if both cooperate
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in t = 2. This payment is conditional on the local company not becoming a
competitor in market A or B:We assume that this is veriable and that no other
side payments are possible.
3.4 Market Expansion
In this section, we look at the case in which the multinationals only motive for
entry is market expansion. We rst look at the di¤erent prots that both rms
make in market A and B depending on whether they cooperate or not. Then we
analyze the incentives of the joint venture partners to extend their cooperation
in t = 2: Finally, we look at the multinationals incentives to enter market B if it
knows that the local company will become a competitor in t = 2:
3.4.1 Prots in Market A and Market B
The Home Market A
In t = 1; there are initially n rms in market A. If the local company enters
market A in t = 2, the total number of rms increases to n+1: In both cases, all
rms engage in Cournot competition.
Proposition 3.1 If there are n rms in market A; the prot of each rm is given
by
An =

aA   c
n+ 1
2
: (3.1)
If the local rm enters market A in t = 2 there are n + 1 rms and each rms
prot is given by
An+1 =

aA   c
n+ 2
2
; (3.2)
with
An > 
A
n+1: (3.3)
The prots are decreasing in n:
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This is a well-known result for a Cournot game with n symmetric players. The
prots in market A decrease in the number of competing rms n: The entry of
the local company in t = 2 decreases the multinationals prot from An to 
A
n+1:
The Foreign Market B
If the multinational enters market B via a joint venture with the local company
and both cooperate in t = 1, they are the only supplier of the good and can act
as a monopoly: If the local company breaks up the joint venture in t = 2, the two
rms compete à la Cournot.
Proposition 3.2 If the multinational and the local company cooperate in market
B, their joint monopoly prot is given by
BM =

aB   c
2
2
: (3.4)
If the multinational and the local company engage in Cournot competition in
t = 2; the prot of each rm is given by
BDuop =

aB   c
3
2
: (3.5)
These are also standard monopoly and Cournot results.
3.4.2 The Joint Venture Relationship
In this section we analyze the joint venture relationship between the multina-
tional and the local company. First, we look at the local companys incentives to
steal the multinationals technology and to become a competitor in both markets.
Second, we look at the impact of the local companys entry on the multinationals
prots. Third, we look at the multinationals incentives to implement coopera-
tion by making a payment to the local company so that it does not become a
competitor.
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The Local Companys Entry Incentives
In the rst period, there is no conict of interest between the multinational and
the local company, since the local company is not yet able to copy the multina-
tionals product. The multinational and the local company cooperate in market
B and share the monopoly prot BM .
At the start of t = 2, the local company has to decide whether it wants to
remain in the partnership with the multinational or become a competitor. If the
local company competes with the multinational in market A, the local company
can make a prot of An+1 as opposed to zero prots if it chooses not to enter the
market.
Lemma 3.1 The local companys entry incentive is given by
An+1 =

aA   c
n+ 2
2
(3.6)
and is decreasing in n.
The more competitive market A, the lower the potential prots for the local
company and the lower its incentives to break up the joint venture and enter
market A:
The Multinationals Cost of Entry
If the multinationals decision to enter market B results in the local company
entering market A in t = 2; the multinationals prot in market A decreases from
An to 
A
n+1: This decrease in prots can be interpreted as the multinationals cost
of entering the foreign market B and depends on n:
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Proposition 3.3 The multinationals cost of entering the foreign market is given
by the decrease in prots in its home market
An   An+1 =

aA   c
n+ 1
2
 

aA   c
n+ 2
2
: (3.7)
This cost is decreasing in n.
We will refer to this as the cost of entry or the competitive threat faced by the
multinational. The negative impact of the local company entering market A on
the multinationals prot is smaller the higher the initial number of domestic rms
n: If initially the number of domestic rms is high, the multinational only makes
small prots even before the entry of the local rm, so having one more rm in the
market does not greatly a¤ect prots. If initially there are very few competitors,
the multinationals prots are high. Hence, an additional competitor would have
a greater impact on the competitive situation and on the multinationals prots.
This implies that rms with very strong positions in their home markets have
the most to lose from entering a new market and, in the process, creating a new
competitor. The cost of entry is illustrated in gure 3.1:
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0
1000
2000
3000
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Figure 3.1: Cost of Entry
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In our model, the competitive pressure in market A is characterized by the
number of rms n: One could also interpret n as a proxy for the maturity of
the product. First, consider the case where a low n characterizes a rather new
product, for which there are only few substitutes (and few competitors). Hence,
the multinationals market position is strong and prot margins are high. If
another rm were to enter this market, this would have a large negative impact on
the multinationals position, so the cost of entering the foreign market is higher for
low values of n. Second, if a high value of n is indicative of a more mature product,
for which there are many substitutes, the multinationals position is less strong
and prot margins are lower. Entering the foreign market and creating a new
competitor would therefore have less of a negative impact on the multinationals
prots. This implies that the multinational should rather enter foreign markets
with more mature products that only yield small prot margins in the home
market and stay away with cutting-edge technologies, for which it can charge a
high premium in its home market.
Implementing Cooperation
If the local company becomes a competitor in t = 2, it would earn An+1 in market
A and BDuop in market B:We assume that the multinational can o¤er to pay the
local company an amount 2
B
M with 0  2  1 under the condition that the
local company remains the multinationals partner and does not enter market
A. We assume that the local company accepts the multinationals o¤er if it is
indi¤erent between cooperating and becoming a competitor.
Proposition 3.4 The local company will cooperate if it receives at least a share
b2 = BDuop + An+1BM (3.8)
of the monopoly prot in market B in t = 2. The necessary share b2 is higher the
higher BDuop; the higher 
A
n+1 and the lower 
B
M : The share b2 is increasing in n:
The local company knows that if both rms compete in market B, the total
prot to be made in a competitive market would be smaller than if both cooperate.
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This is due to the e¢ ciency of monopoly: the monopoly prot is always greater
than the sum of oligopoly prots. The local company will cooperate if what it can
earn from the joint venture in market B is greater than the sum of the duopoly
prots in market B and the prots that it would earn in market A. The shareb2 that is necessary to implement cooperation is higher the more attractive it is
for the local company to break up the joint venture and become a competitor.
This is the case if the duopoly prots BDuop are relatively high compared to the
joint venture prots BM , and if the number of domestic rms n is low, since this
results in higher prots An+1.
We now turn to the multinational. It can implement cooperation by payingb2BM = BDuop + An+1: In this case, the multinational and the local company
continue to have a monopoly in market B, which gives them a joint prot of BM .
Moreover, the local company would not enter market A and the multinationals
prots in market A would remain at An . If the rms cooperate in t = 2; the
multinationals period prot is given by BM +
A
n  
 
BDuop + 
A
n+1

. If both rms
compete in t = 2; the multinationals period prot is given by BDuop + 
A
n+1.
The multinational wants to implement cooperation if the payment to the local
company is small relative to what it would lose if the local company were to
become a competitor.
Lemma 3.2 The multinational nds it protable to implement cooperation by
paying BDuop + 
A
n+1 to the local company if
BM   2BDuop +
 
An   2An+1
  0: (3.9)
Implementation is more attractive the higher the monopoly prots BM and the
lower the duopoly prots BDuop:
Given a price of BDuop+ 
A
n+1, the multinational nds it worthwhile to imple-
ment cooperation and to protect its home market if the inequality in Lemma 3.2
is satised. Cooperation is clearly more attractive if the joint venture prot BM
is high compared to the duopoly prot BDuop:
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The multinationals incentives to implement cooperation also depend on the
potential prots in market A; which in turn are inuenced by the number of
domestic rms n:
Proposition 3.5 With respect to market A; the multinationals incentives to im-
plement cooperation are given by
An   2An+1 =

aA   c
n+ 1
2
  2

aA   c
n+ 2
2
(3.10)
and depend on the number of domestic rms n in a non-monotonic way. The
multinational always implements cooperation if it is a monopolist in market A.
The multinational is least likely to implement cooperation when there are n = 3
rms in market A. However as n increases, implementing cooperation becomes
relatively more attractive:
The e¤ect of the number of domestic rms n on the multinationals imple-
mentation incentives is not straightforward, since there are two opposing e¤ects.
First, consider the local companys entry incentives. The higher the initial n; the
smaller An+1 that the local company can earn by entering market A and the less
attractive it is to break up the joint venture. This makes implementing coopera-
tion cheaper and thus more attractive for the multinational. Second, consider the
competitive threat An   An+1 which is the decrease in the multinationals prots
due to the entry of the local company. The higher the initial number of rms
n, the lower the multinationals prots in market A and the smaller the negative
impact of an additional competitor. For high values of n; the multinational has
less incentives to protect its home market by implementing cooperation.
As n increases, implementing cooperation becomes less costly, but at the
same time less important for the multinational. So what is the overall e¤ect? For
n = 1 the multinational initially is a monopolist in market A and the arrival of
the local company in t = 2 creates a duopoly. The term
 
An   2An+1

becomes 
AM   2ADuop

which as we know is positive due to the e¢ ciency of monopoly.
Hence the inequality in Proposition 2.5 is fullled and a monopolist would always
agree to pay b2BM to the local company if this prevents the local company from
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entering market A. For n  2 the local companys entry incentive An+1 is greater
than the competitive threat An   An+1 faced by the multinational, which makes
implementing cooperation more costly. However, as n increases, the di¤erence
between An+1 and 
A
n   An+1 decreases which makes implementing cooperation
less costly again. This is depicted in gure 3.2
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Figure 3.2: Implementation Incentives
In this section we have shown that the willingness of the multinational to
protect its home market by implementing cooperation in t = 2 critically depends
on the number of domestic rms n. In the monopoly case, the multinational
will always implement cooperation while in other cases, this may not be optimal
since the local companys entry incentives exceed the multinationals incentives to
protect the home market, which makes implementation relatively costly. We are
mostly interested in cases in which the local company breaks up the joint venture
in t = 2 and becomes a competitor of the multinational in both markets. For the
remainder of this chapter, we assume that if the multinational enters market B
and cooperates with the local company in t = 1; the local company will always
compete with the multinational in t = 2:
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3.4.3 The Entry Decision
In this section, we investigate the multinationals entry decision if it knows that
entering market B in t = 1 will create a new competitor in t = 2: If the multi-
national enters the foreign market in order to get access to new customers, its
benets are given by (1   1)BM + BDuop: The cost of entering market B is the
decrease in prots An   An+1 in market A in t = 2:
Proposition 3.6 In the market expansion case, the multinational enters market
B if
(1  1)BM + BDuop 
 
An   An+1

(3.11)
which is equivalent to
(1  1)

aB   c
2
2
+

aB   c
3
2


aA   c
n+ 1
2
 

aA   c
n+ 2
2
: (3.12)
Entry is more protable the higher the prots in the foreign market and the higher
the number of domestic rms n:
The multinational has to weigh the benets and costs of entry against each
other. In the market expansion case, the benets of entry only depend on the
attractiveness of the foreign market and are independent from the number of
domestic rms n: The cost of entry An  An+1 however depends on the number of
domestic competitors. The higher domestic competition already is, the smaller
the damage caused by an additional competitor. Hence, entry is more protable
if the number of domestic rms n is large.
3.5 Cost reduction
We now turn to the case in which the multinational enters market B in t = 1
in order to reduce its marginal cost from c to c0. We no longer consider the
multinationals market expansion motives, so the potential prots in market B
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are irrelevant for our analysis. We know from our previous results that if the
multinational does not reduce cost, its per period prot in market A is given by
An (c; c) =
 
aA   c2
(n+ 1)2
: (3.13)
We assume that if the multinational enters market B; it is immediately able to
produce at the lower cost level c0, while in t = 1; all competitors in market A still
produce at marginal cost c. As a result, there is asymmetric Cournot competition.
We denote the multinationals prot in t = 1 by An (c
0; c):
Proposition 3.7 If the multinational enters market B in t = 1 and is able to
produce at marginal cost c0 < c; there is asymmetric Cournot competition in
market A and the multinationals prot in t = 1 is given by
An (c
0; c) =
 
aA   c+ n (c  c0)2
(n+ 1)2
> An (c; c): (3.14)
The cost reduction increases the multinationals prot. Naturally, the multi-
nationals prots increase in the cost level c of the other competitors and decrease
in the own cost level c0:
In t = 2; the local company enters market A and there is asymmetric Cournot
competition between n + 1 rms. The multinational and the local company
produce at marginal cost c0; while the n  1 other rms produce at marginal cost
c: We denote the multinationals prot by An+1(c
0; c0; c):
Proposition 3.8 If the local company enters market A in t = 2; there is asym-
metric Cournot competition between the n+1 rms and the multinationals prot
is given by
An+1(c
0; c0; c) =
 
aA   c+ n (c  c0)2
(n+ 2)2
(3.15)
with An+1(c
0; c0; c) > An (c; c) for
c0 < bc =

1  (n+2)
(n+1)

(a  c) + cn
n
: (3.16)
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Entering market B allows the multinational to produce at a lower mar-
ginal cost c < c0; but creates a new competitor in t = 2: For very high lev-
els of cost reduction, that is c0 < bc; the cost reduction benets in t = 2
alone already outweigh the decrease in prots due to the increase in competi-
tion and An+1(c
0; c0; c) > An (c; c) holds. From Proposition 3.7, we know that
An (c
0; c) > An (c; c) always holds in t = 1: Hence, for c
0 < bc, the multinational
would increase prots in both periods by entering the foreign market in t = 1.
We now look at the multinationals entry decision. If the multinational chooses
not to enter market B; its prot in each period is given by
An (c; c) = (
a  c
n+ 1
)2: (3.17)
If it chooses to enter market B ; its prot in t = 1 is given by
An (c
0; c) =
 
aA   c+ n (c  c0)2
(n+ 1)2
(3.18)
and its prot in t = 2 is given by
An+1(c
0; c0; c) =
 
aA   c+ n (c  c0)2
(n+ 2)2
: (3.19)
Lemma 3.3 The multinational will enter market B if
EI =
(a  c+ n (c  c0))2
(n+ 1)2
+
(a  c+ n (c  c0))2
(n+ 2)2
  2( a  c
n+ 1
)2 > 0:
The multinational will only enter market B if its cost reduction benets in t =
1 are greater than what it could potentially lose due to the additional competitor
in t = 2: The multinationals incentives to enter market B are a function of the
number of domestic rms n: The shape of the function depends on the parameters
a; c and c0: The di¤erence a c characterizes the initial margins in market A while
the di¤erence c  c0 characterizes the degree of cost reduction.
We are interested in the relationship between the multinationals entry incen-
tives and the number of domestic rms n: Since the derivative of the incentive
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function is highly dependent on the parameters, we have made numerous simu-
lations for di¤erent parameter values in order to get a good idea of the possible
shape of the function. The corresponding graphs are included in the Appendix.
In this section, we present three representative cases. In the three graphs below,
the value for c is set to c = 40:We vary the parameter a and distinguish between
low margins for a   c = 20; intermediate margins for a   c = 40 and high mar-
gins for a   c = 60: Within each of these three regimes, we further distinguish
between a low degree of cost reduction for c0 = 0:75c; an intermediate degree of
cost reduction for c0 = 0:5c and a high degree of cost reduction for c0 = 0:25c:
Each of the following three graphs depicts the entry incentives in a market with
a given margin a  c and three di¤erent levels of cost reduction c  c0:
We rst look at the scenario with small margins, with a  c = 20: The dotted
line represents a high, the broken line an intermediate degree and the solid line
a low degree of cost reduction.
5 10 15 20 25 30
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
n
EI
Figure 3.3: Entry Incentives (low margins)
Proposition 3.9 If the home market is characterized by low margins, the incen-
tives to pursue cost reduction by entering market B are increasing and concave
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in the number of domestic rms n for all degrees of cost reduction The entry
incentives are higher the higher the degree of cost reduction.
For most values of n; the entry incentives are positive. Hence, the benets of
cost reduction outweigh the cost of having an additional competitor in market A:
The higher the number of domestic rms; the higher the multinationals incentives
to enter market B in order to reduce cost. For a given n; entry incentives are
higher the higher the degree of cost reduction. The marginal entry incentives
however are decreasing in n; which is illustrated by the concave shape. The
intuition here is as follows. On the one hand, if n is high, the multinational has
a small market share in market A and hence, the cost reduction only applies to a
small quantity which makes the cost reduction less valuable and entering market
B less attractive. On the other hand, if n is high the multinationals prots in
market A are small and the negative impact of the local companys entry is also
small, which makes entering market B more attractive. As n increases, the cost
reduction benets still outweigh the cost of entry, but become relatively smaller
which is why the marginal incentives decrease.
The intersection points of the incentive functions with the n axis determine
the threshold values where entering marketB becomes protable. We can see that
the threshold values are lower for higher degrees of cost reduction. If the threshold
value is low, the multinational is keen on entering market B even though market
A is very protable and thus, the negative impact of a new competitor would
be high. If the degree of cost reduction is high, the multinational nds entering
market B protable even for low values of n: If the degree of cost reduction is
low, the multinational is more hesitant and only enters market B if market A is
less protable, that is, for higher values of n: The graphs for even lower margins
look similar, only that the entry incentives are higher for any given n and that
the threshold values are smaller. The intuition here is that cost reduction is
even more attractive when initial margins are small and the multinational nds
entering market B protable even for very small values of n; because due to the
low margins, home market prots are small even when there is little competition,
and hence, any damage caused by an additional competitor would be relatively
small.
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We next look at the scenario with intermediate margins, a   c = 40. Again,
the dotted line represents a high, the broken line an intermediate degree and the
solid line a low degree of cost reduction.
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Figure 3.4: Entry Incentives (intermediate margins)
Proposition 3.10 If the home market is characterized by intermediate margins,
the incentives to pursue cost reduction by entering market B are increasing and
concave in the number of domestic rms n if the degree of cost reduction is high.
For intermediate and low degrees of cost reduction, the incentives initially increase
in n and then decrease as n increases. The entry incentives are higher the higher
the degree of cost reduction.
If the degree of cost reduction is high, the entry incentives are increasing and
concave in n, similar to the case when margins are low. For intermediate and
low levels of cost reduction, the entry incentives initially increase for low values
of n and then decrease as n increases. The intuition is as follows. If n is small,
the multinational has a large market share and hence the cost reduction is very
valuable and outweighs the cost of entry which is also high if n is low. As n
increases, both the benets and the cost of entry decrease. If the level of cost
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reduction is only intermediate or low, at some point, the cost reduction benets
decrease more rapidly and become less signicant than the cost of entry, which is
why entry becomes less attractive. This explains the part of the function where
the slope is negative.
Last, we look at the scenario with high margins, a  c = 60. The dotted line
represents a high, the broken line an intermediate degree and the solid line a low
degree of cost reduction.
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Figure 3.5: Entry Incentives (high margins)
Proposition 3.11 If the home market is characterized by high margins, the in-
centives to pursue cost reduction by entering market B initially increase in n and
then decrease as n increases for all degrees of cost reduction. The entry incentives
are higher the higher the degree of cost reduction.
For all degrees of cost reduction, the entry incentives initially increase in n
and then decrease an n increases, similar to the cases with intermediate margins
and intermediate and low levels of cost reduction. The intuition is the same: at
some point, the cost reduction benets decrease more rapidly than the cost of
Technology Theft in Joint Ventures 86
entry. This is even the case for a high level of cost reduction if margins are high.
This is due to the fact that the high margins increase the cost of entry, so that
at some point, the costs become relatively more important than the benets of
entry.
If we compare the three scenarios with the di¤erent margins, we can make
interesting observations with respect to the multinationals entry incentives.
Proposition 3.12 The multinationals incentives to pursue cost reduction by en-
tering market B are higher if market A is characterized by low margins. The
threshold values for entry are higher the higher the margins in market A:
If margins in market A are low, the negative impact of an additional competi-
tor is small compared to the benets of cost reduction. Hence, entering market B
is more attractive if margins in market A are low. The threshold values for entry
are higher if the margins are high. This is due to the fact if the home market is
more protable, the cost of an additional competitor is higher, so the multina-
tional is only willing to create this new competitor by entering market B if the
number of domestic rms is high and the prots relatively low. If margins are
low, the multinational is much less protective of its home market and is willing
to create a new competitor by entering market B even if competition in market
A is low.
3.6 Conclusion
We have studied a multinationals incentives to enter a foreign market via a joint
venture with a local company that might copy the multinationals product and
become a competitor in both the foreign and the multinationals home market.
First, we show that the cost of entering the foreign market and creating a new
competitor decreases in the number of domestic rms, as the negative impact of
an additional competitor is smaller the higher the initial competitive pressure.
Our second nding is that the multinationals willingness to pay to protect its
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home market depends on the number of domestic rms in the domestic market
in a non-monotonic way. If the multinational is a monopolist, it always wants to
implement cooperation. For a small number of rms, the incentives to implement
cooperation are smallest and increase in the number of rms.
We are particularly interested in the way that domestic competitive pressure
a¤ects multinationals incentives to enter the foreign market. First, we considered
the case where the multinationals entry motive is market expansion. We show
that its entry incentives are strictly increasing in the number of domestic rms.
Second, we analyzed the case in which the multinationals motivation for entry
is cost reduction. The relationship between the multinationals entry incentives
depends on the margins in market A and the degree of cost reduction. Our main
ndings are that if margins are low, the entry incentives are strictly increasing
and concave in the number of domestic rms. If margins are high, the entry
incentives initially increase and then decrease in the number of rms.
Our work also makes an interesting contribution to the literature on innovation
and market structure. In most of the literature, the costs of innovation include
expenses for patents, licenses and/or research and development. These costs are
usually xed and independent of the market structure. In our model, entering
the foreign market creates a new competitor in the home market, which alters the
market structure and increases competitive pressure. Hence, the cost of pursuing
the cost-reducing innovation is not a monetary expense, but the emergence of a
new competitor. The cost of entry is the negative impact of the new competitor
and depends on the market structure at home. This chapter focuses on Cournot
competition. If the number of rms prior to the local companys entry is small,
then the impact of an additional competitor is large and the cost of innovation is
high. If the initial number of domestic rms is already high then the impact of
an additional competitor is small and the cost of innovation is low.
The fact that the cost of innovation depends on market structure has im-
portant implications for the rms decision as to whether it should pursue inno-
vation or not. If the innovative activity creates a new market and the benets
are independent of the home market structure, then pursuing innovation is more
attractive the higher the domestic competitive pressure since this is equivalent
to low costs of innovation. If the benets of innovation decrease in the domestic
competitive pressure as in the Cournot example, we have countervailing e¤ects:
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on the one hand, the benets of innovation decrease in the number of rms, which
makes innovation less attractive. On the other hand, the cost of innovation also
decreases in the number of rms which makes innovation more attractive. The
overall e¤ect depends on home market demand, the initial cost level and the de-
gree of cost reduction. We nd that the overall incentives to pursue innovation
are increasing and concave in the number of rms when the initial cost level is
close to home market demand and thus margins are small. When margins are
high, that is the initial cost level is small compared to home market demand, then
the incentives to pursue innovation are increasing for small numbers of domestic
rms and decreasing for large numbers of domestic rms. The empirical implica-
tions of these results are that a rm whose home market is characterized by low
margins should pursue innovation more strongly the higher domestic competition.
The implication is di¤erent for rms whose home market is characterized by high
margins. In this case, the rm has strong incentives to pursue innovation when
the number of rms is small and these incentives decrease when the number of
rms is high.
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3.7 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3.1:
In t = 1, there are n symmetric rms in market A that compete in quantities á
la Cournot. The prot function of the multinational is given by
AMNC = p
A(qA)qAMNC   cqAMNC (3.20)
= (aA   (qAMNC +
nX
i=1
qAi ))q
A
MNC   cqAMNC ; i 6=MNC; (3.21)
the rst order condition is given by
aA   2qAMNC  
nX
i=1
qAi   c != 0; i 6=MNC (3.22)
and the multinationals reaction function is given by
qAMNC(q
A
i ) =
aA  
nX
i=1
qAi   c
2
; i = 1; :::; n; i 6=MNC (3.23)
In the symmetric Cournot equilibrium, the equilibrium values are given by
qA
MNC
=
aA   c
(n+ 1)
; (3.24)
QA = nqA
MNC
=
n(aA   c)
(n+ 1)
; (3.25)
pA =
aA + nc
n+ 1
(3.26)
AMNC = 
A
n = (
aA   c
n+ 1
)2: (3.27)
Analogously, we derive the multinationals prot when there are n+1 symmetric
rms in the market. The prot is then given by
An+1 = (
aA   c
n+ 2
)2 (3.28)
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Proof of Proposition 3.2:
The prot function of the monopolist in market B is given by
B(qB) = (aB   qB)qB   cqB: (3.29)
Maximizing the prot function with respect to quantity gives the monopoly prot
BM =

aB   c
2
2
: (3.30)
In a duopoly, the prot function of each rm is given by
BMNC(q
B
MNC ; q
B
LC) = (a
B   qBMNC   qBLC)qBMNC   cqBMNC : (3.31)
Solving this Cournot game gives the equilibrium prots
BMNC = 
B
LC = 
B
Duop =

aB   c
3
2
: (3.32)
Proof of Lemma 3.1:
The local companys entry incentive is given by
An+1 = (
aA   c
n+ 2
)2: (3.33)
Di¤erentiating An+1 with respect to n gives
dAn+1
dn
=  2
 
aA   c2
(n+ 2)3
< 0: (3.34)
Proof of Proposition 3.3:
The cost of entry is given by
An   An+1 = (
aA   c
n+ 1
)2   (a
A   c
n+ 2
)2: (3.35)
Technology Theft in Joint Ventures 91
Di¤erentiating An   An+1 with respect to n gives
d
 
An   An+1

dn
=  2  aA   c2 3n2 + 9n+ 7
(n2 + 3n+ 2)3
< 0: (3.36)
Proof of Proposition 3.4:
For the local company to cooperate, the following incentive constraint must be
fullled:
2
B
M  BDuop + An+1: (3.37)
Solving for 2 yields
b2 = BDuop + An+1BM =

aB c
3
2
+

aA c
n+2
2

aB c
2
2 : (3.38)
For b2 < 1 it must hold that BDuop+An+1BM < 1 or An+1 < BM   BDuop: This means
that what the local company can gain in the home markets must be smaller
than the di¤erence between the joint venture prots and the duopoly prots in
B. So the local company would only cooperate if the prot opportunities in the
home markets are relatively small compared to the prot opportunities in B. b2
is clearly bigger the bigger BDuop, 
A
n+1 and the lower 
B
M
Di¤erentiating b2 with respect to n yields
db2
dn
=   8
 
aA   c2
(aB   c)2 (n+ 2)3 (3.39)
which is clearly negative.
Proof of Lemma 3.2:
The multinational wants to implement cooperation if
(1  b2)BM + An  BDuop + An+1: (3.40)
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After inserting b2 = BDuop+An+1BM , this is equivalent to
BM   2BDuop + An   2An+1  0: (3.41)
The multinationals incentives to implement cooperation are clearly higher the
higher BM and the lower 
B
Duop:
Proof of proposition 3.5:
We are interested in the di¤erence between the competitive threat An  An+1 and
the entry incentive An+1; which is equivalent to
An   2An+1 =

a  c
n+ 1
2
  2

a  c
n+ 2
2
: (3.42)
For illustrative purposes, we provide the numerical values for An   2An+1 for
n = 1; ::; 7:
A1   2A2 =
1
36
(a  c)2 = 0:0278 (a  c)2 > 0 (3.43)
A2   2A3 =  
1
72
(a  c)2 =  0:0138 (a  c)2 < 0 (3.44)
A3   2A4 =  
7
400
(a  c)2 =  0:0175 (a  c)2 < 0 (3.45)
A4   2A5 =  
7
450
(a  c)2 =  0:0156 (a  c)2 < 0 (3.46)
A5   2A6 =  
23
1764
(a  c)2 =  0:0130 (a  c)2 < 0 (3.47)
A6   2A7 =  
17
1568
(a  c)2 =  0:0108 (a  c)2 < 0 (3.48)
We can see that
An   2An+1 > 0 (3.49)
only holds for n = 1: For n  2; we have
An   2An+1 < 0 (3.50)
and
lim
n!1
 
An   2An+1

= 0: (3.51)
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Proof of proposition 3.6:
The multinational will enter market B if
(1  1)

aB   c
2
2
+

aB   c
3
2


aA   c
n+ 1
2
 

aA   c
n+ 2
2
: (3.52)
We know from Proposition 3.3 that

aA c
n+1
2
 

aA c
n+2
2
is decreasing in n: Hence,
entry is more attractive the higher n:
Proof of proposition 3.7:
In t=1, there are n rms. The multinationals produces at marginal cost c0 while
the n   1 other rms produce at marginal cost c. The multinationals prot
function is given by
AMNC = p
A(qA)qAMNC cqAMNC = (aA (qAMNC+(n 1)qAj ))qAMNC c0qAMNC : (3.53)
The multinationals reaction function is given by
qAMNC =
aA   (n  1)qAj   c0
2
: (3.54)
The prot function of rm i; i = 1; :::; n, i 6=MNC is given by
Ai = p
A(qA)qAi   cqAi = (aA   (qAi + qAMNC + (n  2)qAk ))qAi   cqAi : (3.55)
The rst order condition is given by
dAj
dqAi
= aA   2qAi   qAMNC   (n  2)qk   c != 0: (3.56)
Using qAi = q
A
k yields
qAi =
aA   qAMNC   c
n
: (3.57)
Inserting qAMNC =
aA (n 1)qAi  c0
2
yields
qAi =
 
aA   2c+ c0
(n+ 1)
: (3.58)
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Hence,
qAMNC =
 
aA   c+ n (c  c0)
n+ 1
; (3.59)
qAges =
 
c  c0 + n  aA   c
n+ 1
; (3.60)
pA(qges) =
 
aA   c+ c0 + cn
n+ 1
; (3.61)
MNC = 
A
n+1(c
0; c) =
 
aA   c+ n (c  c0)2
(n+ 1)2
(3.62)
j =
 
aA   2c+ c02
(n+ 1)2
(3.63)
Proof of proposition 3.8:
In t=2, there are n+1 rms in market A and the multinational and the local rm
produce at c0 while the n  1 other rms produce at c:
The multinationals prot function is given by
AMNC = p(q)q
A
MNC   c0qAMNC = (aA   (qAMNC + qALC + (n  1)qAi ))qAMNC   c0qAMNC
(3.64)
and the multinationals reaction function is given by
qAMNC =
aA   qALC   (n  1)qAi   c0
2
: (3.65)
Analogously, the local companys reaction function is given by
qALC =
aA   qAMNC   (n  1)qAi   c0
2
: (3.66)
Using qAMNC = q
A
LC yields the reaction functions
qAMNC = q
A
LC =
aA   (n  1)qAi   c0
3
: (3.67)
The prot function of a representative domestic rm producing at cost level c < c0
Technology Theft in Joint Ventures 95
is given by
j = p(q)q
A
i   cqAi = (aA   (qAi + qAMNC + qALC + (n  2)qk))qAi   cqAi (3.68)
and its reaction function is given by
qAi =
aA   qAMNC   qALC   c
n
: (3.69)
Inserting the reaction functions and solving for the quantities yields
Inserting these reaction functions into qAi =
aA qAMNC qALC c
n
yields
qAi =
 
aA   3c+ 2c0
n+ 2
(3.70)
qAMNC = q
A
LC =
 
aA   c+ n (c  c0)
n+ 2
; (3.71)
q =
 
aA + c  2c0 + n (a  c)
n+ 2
; (3.72)
p =
 
aA   c+ 2c0 + cn
n+ 2
; (3.73)
AMNC = 
A
LC = 
A
n+1(c
0; c0; c) =
 
aA   c+ n (c  c0)2
(n+ 2)2
(3.74)
j =
 
aA   3c+ 2c02
(n+ 2)2
(3.75)
Note that An+1(c
0; c0; c) > An (c; c) is equivalent to
(a  c+ n (c  c0))2
(n+ 2)2
> (
a  c
n+ 1
)2 (3.76)
which is equivalent to
c0 <

1  (n+2)
(n+1)

(a  c) + cn
n
: (3.77)
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Proof of Lemma 3.3:
The multinational will enter market A if
An (c
0; c) + An+1(c
0; c0; c) > 2An (c; c) (3.78)
which is equivalent to 
aA   c+ n (c  c0)2
(n+ 2)2
+
 
aA   c+ n (c  c0)2
(n+ 1)2
  2
 
aA   c2
(n+ 1)2
> 0: (3.79)
Illustrations of the simulations for Propositions 3.9-3.11:
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Figure 3.6: Simulation 1: a = 400; c = 40
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Figure 3.7: Simulation 2: a = 320; c = 40
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Figure 3.8: Simulation 3: a = 240; c = 40
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Figure 3.9: Simulation 4: a = 160; c = 40
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Figure 3.10: Simulation 5: a = 120; c = 40
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Figure 3.11: Simulation 6: a = 80; c = 40
5 10 15 20 25 30
-400
-200
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
1800
2000
2200
n
EI
Figure 3.12: Simulation 7: a = 60; c = 40
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